L’ancien
constitutionnalisme, le pouvoir, la société
Naomi
Chazan & Donald Rothchild
Naomi Chazan
Présenté à :
M. GAZIBO
Par : Manuel
Litalien
Université de Montréal
27 janvier 2002
MAPING
Introduction 3
Contemporary
Africa, Chapter 2
3
Chapter 5 8
The
Precarious Balance, State and Society in Africa.
12
Conclusion 17-18
Africa and its Challenges to Political Theories
How can Africa be
studied? What political process came out of the postcolonial period? To answer
these questions, Naomi Chazan concentrated her observations around elements such
as institutions, regimes and pattern of State-society. In order to grasp the
whole complexity of the African situation, this report will first summarise the
author’s thoughts to follow with a more critical analysis. Chazan forward a
different typology than the one suggested by Jean-François Médard’s.[1]
The latter was inspired by Weber’s neo-patrimonialism and patrimonialsm to
study new social classes in postcolonial Africa as well as historical
diversities of the African countries. Therefore, Médard and Chazan
agree on the plurality of scenarios existing within the geographical
boundaries left by colonial occupation. Médard argue that strangers often see
one aspect of the reality.[2]
This paper will underling other perspectives in order to grasp another piece of
the African socio-political reality.
Let us begin with Contemporary
Africa, Chapter 2 and 5. The basic concepts of contemporary African politics
are the state, social groups, ethnicity, and class.[3]
Chapter 2 focuses on “the consolidation and alteration of formal government
institutions”.[4] Clearly, the state is a
critical actor in the public arena. Which could here be related to the three
types of néo-institutional approach as discuss in the text of Hall and Taylor.[5]
Beside these different elements of analysis stand three conceptual
approach, namely the organic, the configuration
and finally the interactive approach.
Her book operates a constant shift between the last three conceptual approach,
as each of them has its strong and weak points. Precisely, the state for chazan
is not the only actor accountable for African politics. In the organic
approach, several themes have been underlined in order to understand the state:
1) the notion of state as a structure of domination 2) the idea of the state as
a unitary actor separated (autonomous) from society 3) the concept of state as
fulfilling certain functions. These themes takes for granted the centrality of
the state in the independence period. In this approach, stress is put on the
state to explain socio-economic phenomena. The weak points is that the view of
the state is “incomplete and somewhat mechanistic”.[6]
The state often takes anthropomorphic qualities. As for the configuration
approach, it provides a “framework in which social groups forms and in which
certain types of political action” are made possible or limited. Thus, state
institutions affects not only the types of political issues raised, but how they
are resolved. Here state structures tells the parameters of social action. The
last but not the least, the interactive
approach. She points out that it builds on the insight of the two other
approaches. In this case, the social structure becomes the main focus. Implied
as social structures are: specific groups, their strategies and their rules. The
approach seeks to understand how the interactions between state institutions and
social groups are having an impact on public institutions as well as social
formations of any kind. The unity of the state becomes less assertive with the
interactive approach. In sum, these three approaches are used to investigate
state structure, economic and political institution to better understand the
connection between institution in the public domain. This on order to get a
clear picture of the specificity pertaining to the African countries.
The first phase of
postcolonial period is what Chazan called Concentration
of State Power. The foundations of African states is being here looked upon
as the colonial legacy. There, she raises two aspects of decolonization,
respectively devolution of the administrative apparatus and the transfer of the
political apparatus. “After independence, African leaders received structures
of control but lack of power base.”[7]
The pluralist institutions created by the colonisation were molded in a
centralised authoritarian colonial context. This issue has also been treated in
Bertrand Badie’s book L’État importé.[8]
Therefore the problem they were used to face reflected the concerns of the
colonial designers. This lead to reorganisation of the public institutions and
concentrating power at the centre. At this point, the system of domination
replaced the institutional networks of the colonial period.[9]
The first postcolonial period saw the consolidation of state institutions, power
concentration and power diffusion. In that period, the state had tenuous power
and legitimacy and very little authority.[10]
The second phase is the
Elaboration of State Power. During the
60s and 70s, to the reorganisation of government structure succeeded new form of
public administration, coercive
apparatus, legal order and political institutions. Administration
can be summarise as follow, growth of bureaucratic in African states. The
expansion of parastatals (state enterprise). Proliferation of state-owned
enterprise, which proved to be inefficient. Civil servants and government
emerged as a new dominant class in postcolonial period. The expansion of the
administration happens to highlight the frailty of the institutions in most of
African states.
The Coercive apparatus relates to the elaboration of state power, as
such the process of militarization. This resume to the growth of enforcement
agencies, like the police. The military and the police are all symbol of
independence. Then the question of military cohesion appeared. The military
became an essential branch of formal sovereign structures. The relation between
decision-maker and armed forced had an impact on the social environment. As a
consequence, it could undermine the very state which built it.
The legal order : generally the legal system was built on two foundation,
the customary law which was different to every localities. The second was the
set of institution, such as courts of appeal. Here is also the important
question of the constitution. Court began to be a mean to contest traditional
authority, for example in the case of land disagreement. Their were also cases
of confrontation between the court and the government over civil rights. This
does not mean that the court was excluded from political favouritism.
The last element is
what the author calls the Political
machinery. The first two decade after independence, the subordination of the
political apparatus, so the political manoeuvre was under the constraint to the
executive. Legislature had little voice in decision-making. Later, the single
party-system which was created shortly after independence was taking new
distinct forms. The party became a medium for political communication and a
legitimating device. This lead opening to the multiparty system. It was measure
with success only in Mauritius and Namibia. The problem is that most African
government lacked well-defined popular foundation. Chazan calls it the state
crisis of legitimacy before the tribunal of African pluralism.[11]
So to conclude on this
second phase called the Elaboration of
State Power, “the process of administrative proliferation and political
enfeeblement made lots of African institutions weak.[12]
This brings us to the third phase: Reconsideration
of State power. Late 70s and early 80s, this was a time of organisational
crisis. The crisis was a characteristic of the state-society relations for
Chazan. The situation had numerous reasons: 1) regime change lead population
uncertain, 2) the extensive nature of the administration and coercive apparatus,
3) government institution used public funds for enrichment of their civil
servants, politicians and supporters, 4) abuse of public office (elite fighting
for their piece of pie), 5) institutions inability to fulfil small basic task.
Again, state institution crisis were not experience to the same degree in all
African countries.
What has been under
study lately is the centralised statism that marked the first decade of
independence. Lots of authoritarian regime still persisted through the 90s, but
most of the countries agreed to review their structure of the public sphere and
institutional adjustment. The weakness of the government has been identified:
“scarcity of resources, politicised patterns of social differentiation, over
expanded state structures, insufficient state legitimacy, inadequate state
power, and the lack of adaptation of alien institution to local conditions.”[13]
Other external and internal factors have come to play an important role. Example,
support plans from foreign donors, IMF and World Bank. New opening to
participatory opportunities, for example political oppositions. This meant
allowing greater competition in the political arena. Meanwhile, with progress,
anarchy is still a threat.[14]
Chapter 5 is the
author’s typology methods. She explains the lens through which African
politics can be analysed. Again, this is far more nuance than the analysis
proposed by Jean-Fraçois Médard. Here is a typology of 6 regimes: Administrative-hegemonic, Pluralist,
Party-mobilising, Party-centralist,
Personal-coercive and Populist.
It attempts to illustrate the political realities of the African countries
between 1951 and 1999.
She
starts with the Administrative-hegemonic regimes. They relate to three key
institutions: the executive, the bureaucracy and the coercive apparatus. Here,
policy decision revolves around the leader and his close advisers. The
bureaucracy carries out mainly specific technical and professional decisions. As
for the coercive apparatus, the military are more generally under control.[15]
As this type of regime seems to be exclusionary, major actors are involved in
the decision-making process. For example, Policy makers, Interest group leaders
(ethnic, regional, class, occupational and gender) can be found co-operating
with governmental institutions. Here, state resources and states office are
being use to construct a state managerial class. This type of regime has been
marked by the solidity of the dominant class. The Administrative-hegemonic
regime has been known to encourage foreign investment, but in the same time,
poor redistribution of resource. Conflict has arisen mainly within the elite or
among factions organised by members of the ruling class.[16]
Apparently, this regime has acquired certain degree of stability through
flexibility and response to the dominant class and ethnic forces. For example:
Kenya, Zair (under Mobutu) and Morocco. But again, the author reminds us that
within the Administrative-hegemonic regime exist varying degree of stability.
Some regime are more competitive than others. For example, strife-ridden
administrative competitive regimes (Nigeria), and patrimonial-administrative
regimes (Togo, Liberia, Congo).
Lets
know turn to the Pluralist regimes. The relationship between public bodies has been
based on separation of power, as well as multiparty political institutions and
representative structures. The political agenda has focus on pursuing
interest-group involvement and autonomous non-governmental activities. The
notion of check-and balance has been retained, resulting in a loosely organised
political context where centralised political structures is not as apparent as
in the administrative regime. The political inclusion has brought more concern
with local issues.[17]
Yet this type of regime has not succeeded in maintaining themselves in Africa.
The workability of the pluralist regime has proven to be very few : Botswana,
Mauritius, Senegal, Namibia. Unfortunately, pluralist regimes have been
associated mainly with clientelism and elite privilege. In the 1990s, African
regimes had to open up because of mass protest.
Our third regime is the
Party-Mobilising regime. It is said
to have elements of the Pluralist and Administrative-hegemonic regimes. All Party-Mobilising regime has reflected the
“organisational preferences of founding fathers with strong socialist
predispositions”.[18]
Socialist predispositions were mainly until the 1990s. Here the public
institutions rested on the combination of strong one-party domination with
bureaucratic expansion under the control of an executive president. Here, the
politico-administrative pattern of institutionalisation encouraged the
centralisation of power around the leader and the party. The coercive device has
proven to be the consolidation of party-state control. Here the social control
has been gain through heavy national and party identification and affiliation.
The Party-Mobilising regime depends heavily on ideology and has promoted unity
and uniformity in their political discourse. These regimes have a mixed history
of independence, in some cases strong social organisation was present, as it was
the case with Uganda and Ghana. This type of regime has become virtually extinct
in the 1990s.
Party-Centralist regimes are also quite distinct form of regime since the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Their traits are mainly extensive central control and direction.
They have been less tolerant to the local social force demands and they also
have been quite reluctant with external actors. Some of the countries that could
here be put forward are Angola, Benin, Mozambique. The unity party goes above
the administrative structures and in some countries the military’s presence
too pronounced. This type of regime usually rejects state-society relations,
although some exception can be found.[19]
Violent rebellion has been a constant concern also. The Party-Centralist regime
was engage in state-owned institution.
Personal-Coercive Regimes can be associated with the connection between a strong leader and the
coercive apparatus. The bureaucracy, the political machinery, the court system
all have been subjugated by the leader and the military force. All exchanges
have been regularised, as in dictatorial regime. These regimes have limited the
ability to gain access to public institutions. In Liberia, for example, the
strategy was absolutist control. Personal-Coercive Regimes have not fared well
in postindependence Africa.
Populist Regimes on the other hand, has emerged in the 1980s and responded to
unpredictable dictatorial trends. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(formerly Zaire). It sought to reconstruct public institutions and its
interrelation with social groups. It sought to introduce a direct popular voice
in policy making and to limit the independence of the bureaucracy. Populist
regimes relies on the concept of social inclusion defined in none elite terms.
The main concern has been to mobilise popular support and limit the elite’s
privilege. Here the key concern was regulating states economic enterprise.
Unfortunately, these regimes have proven to be transitory to
Hegemonic-administrative forms.
In sum, after
enumerating her typology the author explains how these forms of regimes are
fluid and requires, from the observer, to analyse the way decisions are being
taken and implemented. The response to the decision, as to what action it evokes,
also reveals the political process.
The next text also by
Chazan is The Precarious Balance, State
and Society in Africa. This part will focus on her Chapter 5, where she
seeks to explain patterns of state-society. Her arguments evolves around two
elements: incorporation and disengagement. She starts off be stipulating how
hard it is to grasp realities with limitation of existing framework of analysis.
By such, she explains the limitation of the State-centric approaches. The unit of analysis for these approaches
is the state. It has stressed the importance of the state as a historical actor
and a key agent of macropolitical processes. It looks at the political process
from the top down. Their object of analysis is the social and economic trends.
So, the present situation and conditions would be explain in terms of state,
state policy and reactions to state actions. Clearly these approaches have an
anthropomorphic view of the state as an entity.
Recently, the state
autonomy and state failure have directed the attention on economic deterioration
and decline. Therefore the state-centric approaches have proven to be far less
useful than the Society-based
approaches. They highlight survival strategies in changing economics and
political circumstances. Therefore focussing more on the internal dynamic of
socio-economic. These Society-based approaches allow to explore the identities
of specific social groups. The analysis is from bottom up, contrary to the
State-centric approaches. Here the unit of analysis is specific social group or
local communities. The level of analysis is clearly the micro collectivity. The
object of analysis is the socio-economic process as well as political dynamics.
Explanations of the current African situation are in terms of social
predilection, action and behaviour. Likewise, the danger of macro analysis was
to over generalise, here at the micro level, the danger is to minimise or even
to ignore the state activities. Delimiting overlapping manifestations of social
and political action has also been a major concern. State is no longer view as
the centre stage of shifting social relation.[20]
Overall, African
politics defies the neat, clear-cut classification. The images of African
politics today are disparate. Chazan speaks of the relativity of the
state-society relations, which has to be recognise officially. So, State-society
becomes a dependent and independent variable to the political process. The state
is no longer recognised as having an entity on its own.[21]
From this it is easy to deduce that power, politics and control are no longer
“coterminous” with the “state”.[22]
This leads us to identify varieties of states and degree of stateness on the
African continent. Why for example, some states have problem attaining their
goal?
To analyse this
perspective, Chazan turns to the dimension of Incorporation and disengagement.
What are the Substantive Dimensions,
the human dimensions, the spatial dimensions and the symbolic dimensions? In the
substantive dimensions, the state is view as a “public bureaucracy or
administrative apparatus who is responsible in maintaining external security,
internal order, economic activity and ideological-cultural cohesion.”[23]
The author puts an emphasis on informal and nonformal economy. The result of
failure comes from governments, inadequate and irrelevant policies, eager
incentives, poor distribution mechanisms and rampant inefficiency and
corruption. This has altered production and limited accumulation. So the result
is a parallel economy between the informal and nonformal. The author observed
the economic separation of the state and social groups. After, she relates
informal economy to “smuggling”.
“It
is activities that are supposedly controlled by the state but… either evade
this control or involve illegal use of state position… the nonformal economy (which
ignores the state and operates beyond its each) is beginning to emerge.”[24]
The
parallel economy is also a result of the state engagement in the market or the
frailties of state economic structures. It is marked by the quest for
self-reliance. Local communities function without governments.[25]
The most tangible economic disengagement of the state is measurable: it
is the physical escape from its territory. This is outward migration pursued by
either skilled professionals or rural manual labour. Chazan interprets it as a
process of economic incorporation and disengagement between the state and
society. The state is beyond state control and is a challenge to the validity of
the political power structure. Efforts have been made on this issue by engaging
large portion of their population to the political and economical sphere.
Highlighting local cultural properties has been one other aspect of the
situation.
The Human Dimensions could be characterise as the relation between specific
groups and those who occupy state office. It centres on the organisation of the
actors within, alongside and beyond public institutions. The human axis of the
state-society is concern with the notion of the state as an entity, which
embodies the structure of the human interactions.[26]
Here the concerns are about the emergence of new classes and their impact on
society. Nevertheless, class relations lack cohesive structure in Africa. Soft
“state” is a direct result of a situation where “no class is really in
control and dominant enough to ensure reproduction of a given macro-economic
system”.[27]
Institutions are seen as an important way toward class formation. The ethnicity
here is also another way to look at the social process, since they have been
effective in the extraction of state resource. Chazan mentions the possibility
that ethnicity autonomy will eventually become counter-integrative. So we have
ethnicity and class as a tool to the variety of social organisation. Religious
groups, state managers and women are also key agents. Africa’s distinction
between private and public is precisely founded in terms of household (private)
and state (public) division. The human dimensions allow to examine dynamic that
would otherwise be left out in a state-centric view.
Spatial Dimensions takes on the geographical aspect. The location of the various activities
of specific groups. The state here is define as the key arena for decision
making and social interchange. Although, formal geographical boundaries of the
states are still matters of conflict, the territorial concept is a major aspect
in analysing power issues. Spatial facet of incorporation and disengagement shed
lights on where power is held in the political process.[28]
Here, the smallest unit of exchange would be the household and the village
community. Each of them has their domestic and international contacts. She
studies the settings of the new process of social differentiation, political
participation and capitalist growth. That is very well represented by the new
increase in urbanisation. She mentions regions and geographically defined
cultural entities as key loci of activity and interaction. One can firmly argue
that the boundaries of African state are highly porous. In this context of
fluidity; boundaries are being redefine and social, economic and cultural spaces
reorganised.[29]
Symbolic Dimensions deals with the problem of identity. Here the state plays a normative
role of binding values. Relations between social groups and the state can be
viewed in terms of utility or identity. The identification with the state is
subjective and can have profound historical connections other than with shared
memories. Africa has strong historical roots that predate by far the colonial
period. However, the history of the contemporary African states are not so well
grounded. Therefore, unity and common consciousness are what she identifies as a
“myth” which belongs to the domain of ideologies. This is precisely what she
refers to as a normative model of construction. Some of these models are there
to maintain the position and status of the ruling elites.[30]
Her conclusion on this matter is that many groups that links with each other and
with the state do so because they think it is worthwhile. New modes of
interactions are giving ways to new ideologies. Integration is about identity,
organisation, consciousness and action, “including a range of relationships
between a sense of difference and the state or political whole”.[31]
In sum, attachment to
social groups and state structure have moved along substantive, human, spatial
and symbolic lines. Actual movements within and outside the state-society have
allowed to rethink the notion of state, statehood and stateness. The study
offered by Chazan is a major attempt to delineate the state-society relation.
The nature of the African states is a result of the rhythm of the relations
between social entities, public institutions and officials.[32]
Leaders’ organic view of the state is giving away to a more locally define
interactive notion of statehood. So, the patterns of incorporation and
disengagement have had many different kinds, depending on the time, the
location, and the entity involved. Politics are principally an ongoing process
in Africa that will need further attention.
Chazan’s work is
deeply concerned with the complexity of the African political realities. One
gets the impression her works gives justice to that complexity by giving us new
means of comparison. Her typology attempts to classify the distinctions inherent
to the African states by shifting from the macro
to the micro analysis. Yet the reader
has a strong feeling she emphasises the micro
perspective with her state-society focus. It shows her unity of references in
relation to her ontological approach of the African countries.[33]
The author’s work is far from being simple because of her desire to embrace so
many aspects of the political African realities. Meanwhile, her thorough
introspection of the socio-political sphere allows the readers to go beyond
models previously read in the text of Jean-François Médard: États
d’Afrique noire and the notion of patrimonialsim and néo-patrimonialsm of
Max Weber.
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[1] Médard,Jean-François, L’état néo-patrimonial en Afrique noire, p.323
[2] Médard, Jean-François, L’état néo-patrimonial en Afrique noire, p.353
[3] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.37
[4] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.40
[5] HALL, Peter A., TAYLOR, C.R., « La science politique et les trois néo-institutionnalismes », Revue française de science politique, vol. :47, n.o.3-4, juin-août, 1997
[6] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.40
[7] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.46
[8] BADIE, Bertrand, L‘état importé, Essai sur l’occidentalistaion de l’ordre politique, France, éd. : Fayard
[9] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.54
[10] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.54
[11] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.64
[12] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.65
[13] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.66
[14] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.69
[15] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.142
[16] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.144
[17] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.145
[18] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.147
[19] CHAZAN, Naomi, Politics and Society in Cotemporary Africa, p.150
[20] CHAZAN, Naomi, The Precarious Blance, State and Society in Africa, p. 122
[21] CHAZAN, Naomi, The Precarious Blance, State and Society in Africa, p. 123
[22] CHAZAN, Naomi, The Precarious Blance, State and Society in Africa, p. 123
[23] CHAZAN, Naomi, The Precarious Blance, State and Society in Africa, p.125
[24] CHAZAN, Naomi, The Precarious Blance, State and Society in Africa, p.126
[25] CHAZAN, Naomi, The Precarious Blance, State and Society in Africa, p.127
[26] CHAZAN, Naomi, The Precarious Blance, State and Society in Africa, p.132
[27] CHAZAN, Naomi, The Precarious Blance, State and Society in Africa, p.134
[28] CHAZAN, Naomi, The Precarious Blance, State and Society in Africa, p.136
[29] CHAZAN, Naomi, The Precarious Blance, State and Society in Africa, p.138
[30] CHAZAN, Naomi, The Precarious Blance, State and Society in Africa, p.139
[31] CHAZAN, Naomi, The Precarious Blance, State and Society in Africa, p.139
[32] CHAZAN, Naomi, The Precarious Blance, State and Society in Africa, p.140
[33] BÉLANGER, André-J., « Épistémologues de la science politique à vos marques! », Épistémologie de la science politique, p.32