


SOCIAL INFLUENCE:  
SOCIAL NORMS, CONFORMITY,  
AND COMPLIANCE

ROBERT B. CIA LDINI, Arizona State University  
MELANIE R. TROST, Arizona State University

Through the influence process we generate and manage change in the social world. Like most things, this process can be handled poorly or well. It can be employed to foster growth and to move people away from negative habits and in more positive directions, thereby creating the conditions for new change opportunities. Or, it can be used clumsily, reducing the chance for genuine movement and, in the worst of cases, boomeranging into conflict and resentment. Thus, those who wish to understand fully the process of personal change must understand just as fully the process of interpersonal influence. Fortunately, there currently exists in the literature of social science a large body of information on how, why, and when the influence process works most effectively.

This chapter focuses on three major components of that large body of information: social norms, conformity, and compliance. Throughout, we consider these topics in terms of a fundamental theme: that the behaviors they comprise are goal-directed. In our review of the relevant literatures, we were continually struck by the extent to which these behaviors could be interpreted as purposive (but not necessarily conscious) attempts to achieve a relatively small set of goals: to behave effectively, to build and maintain relationships, and to manage self-concept. Consequently, in the pages that follow, these goals serve as organizing structures for much of the material we present. Sometimes a particular influence-related behavior serves more than one of the goals. In these instances, the behavior is examined with respect to what appears to be its primary function. Although we feel that the three goals offer valuable insights into the circumstances and motivations that lead to interpersonal influence, the goals do not apply equally to the three focal topics of social norms, conformity, and compliance; therefore, differing emphases are applied in the treatments of these three topics.

Before launching into substantive issues, one final prefatory comment seems warranted. Rather than emphasizing the goals of the influence agent, we have chosen to emphasize the goals of the influence target. Our review of the relevant literature suggested that the more intriguing and instructive questions concerned not so much the reasons that someone would choose to influence another as the reasons that someone would choose to yield to influence from another. Accordingly, we invite readers to consider the benefits of viewing the influence process from the perspective of the target person and in terms of what he or she stands to gain from change.

SOCIAL NORMS

A norm is, like other psychological phenomena, a construct that has widespread usage because it helps describe and explain human behavior. Cultural norms have been implicated in the existence of behaviors that seemed to be arbitrary and bizarre from a Western perspective (e.g., the ancient practice of binding the feet of Chinese women or the Inca's ritual of human sacrifice; Sumner, 1906), as well as more beneficent control mechanisms that keep anarchy at bay in most societies (e.g., sanctions against unprovoked aggression; Pepitone, 1976).

Norms have been conceptualized in a variety of ways. Sumner (1906) wrote of "folkways"—habitual customs exhibited by a group because they were originally expedient in meeting basic needs. Sherif (1936) described norms as jointly negotiated rules for social behavior, the "customs, traditions, standards, rules, values, fashions, and all
other criteria of conduct which are standardized as a consequence of the contact of individuals” (p. 3). Pepitone (1976) added the caveat that “by normative it means that such social behavior is more characteristic (e.g., more uniform) of some sociocultural collective unit than of individuals observed at random” (p. 642). Norms vary to the extent to which they are injunctive, prescribing the valued social behavior, versus descriptive, informing us about how others act in similar situations (Cialdini, Kaligren, & Reno, 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kaligren, 1990; Schaffler, 1963). In addition to commonly accepted rules of desirable behavior, norms have included rules forbidding unacceptable social behaviors, such as taboos against incest or infanticide, and laws or standards for conduct established by a government or elected body (Triandis, 1994).

This chapter focuses on norms that are primarily social in nature. Social norms are rules and standards that are understood by members of a group, and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force of law. These norms emerge out of interaction with others; they may or may not be stated explicitly, and any sanctions for deviating from them come from social networks, not the legal system. Social norms can include general, societal expectations for our behavior (Blake & Davis, 1964; Pepitone, 1976); the expectations of valued others for our behavior (e.g., the subjective norms of Fishbein and Ajzen’s [1975] theory of reasoned action); our own expectations for our behavior (e.g., Schwartz’s [1977] personal norms); and standards that develop out of our observations of others’ behavior (e.g., Cialdini, Reno, and Kaligren’s [1990] descriptive norms).

There has been some debate about the usefulness of norms as an explanatory concept (cf. Darley & Latané, 1970; Krebs, 1970; Krebs & Miller, 1985), and in fact, the variety of conceptualizations may have contributed to the confusion concerning the actual role of social norms in directing our behavior. Recent theoretical developments have helped to clarify when and how norms can be expected to affect behavior (Cialdini, Kaligren, & Reno, 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kaligren, 1990) and to facilitate the accomplishment of basic social influence goals. We will describe how social norms can help shape the desire to act effectively, to build and maintain relationships with others, and to maintain self-image, but first we will discuss social psychological theory and research concerning how norms are formed, why they develop, and how they are transmitted to others.

**Formation and Transmission of Norms**

Although norms are common explanatory tools in the social sciences, relatively little attention is given to their origins (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Pepitone, 1976) or to how they are shared with others (Allison, 1992). Two different perspectives speak most clearly to the question of how social norms emerge within social systems. One perspective argues that norms are arbitrary rules for behavior that are adopted because they are valued or reinforced by the culture (cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Opp, 1982; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). An alternative perspective argues that normative behavior is functional and aids in accomplishing the goals of the group (cf. Allison, 1992; Campbell, 1975; Sherif, 1936; Summer, 1906), implying that ineffective or incorrect norms should not persist (Jacobs & Campbell, 1961; Schaller & Latané, 1996). The primary distinction between these two perspectives is the extent to which social norms may sustain arbitrary patterns of behavior. A closer examination of how norms emerge and are passed on to others argues that both perspectives can account for normative behavior, but that there are limits to the types of behavior that will be susceptible to arbitrary normative pressures.

**Societal-Value Perspective** Theorists influenced by the anthropological traditions of Boas and Mead have long held that norms are culturally specific and capricious, and that the power of any norm is derived solely from its value to the culture within which it operates. In other words, the substance of any norm is neither inherently good nor inherently valuable; its power is granted by its acceptance within the culture (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). As noted earlier, this perspective grew out of the dilemmas faced by early anthropologists, who had to reconcile seemingly bizarre behaviors in other cultures, such as cannibalism, with a Western sensibility (Summer, 1906).

Opp (1982) proposed that most norms that guide our daily activities have evolved from behaviors that are performed and rewarded repeatedly, either directly or through vicarious reinforcement from others in the society (see also Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Summer, 1906). The behaviors then become the preferred responses to particular situations because of their reward power. The strength of these preferences will depend on the extent to which (1) there are communication opportunities between people in the social group that allow them to pass the norm to others, (2) the group is a cohesive unit and values uniform behavior, and (3) the norm is important for the group. Once these preferences are established and the costs associated with nonnormative behavior are made known, members of the social network will discourage any deviant tendencies by voicing what other members “should” or “ought to” do. These norms are, at that point, accepted and internalized by the group members. Sanctions, such as laws, may then develop to support the norms.

This pure reinforcement perspective leads one to conclude that any behavior that is valued and rewarded can become a norm, allowing for the emergence of arbitrary be-
behavior patterns on a cultural level. For example, if American businesspeople were rewarded for wearing “athletic supporters and tie-dyed shirts while crab-walking backward with basketballs in their mouths” instead of dark wool business suits during the hotter summer months, they would abandon the stuffy suits for the more colorful attire (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991, p. 104). Haberdashery customs are, in fact, an excellent example of local norms that appear to be random. Scottish men wear kilts and Montanna men wear cowboy hats—neither of which are particularly effective in combating the cold weather of the two regions. Likewise, while choice of foods has historically been determined by what grows in a particular region, preferences for preparing those foods vary by local tradition (e.g., Irish boiled potatoes versus French fries). Sherif (1936) noted that all humans share basic needs for food, shelter, and mating; he also believed that “how and under what circumstances they will eat, mate and enjoy shelter are, to a great extent, regulated by customs, traditions, laws and social standards” (p. 1). Also prominent in Sherif’s comment is the notion that norms emerge to satisfy basic human needs and desires.

**Functional Perspective** Other social theorists have argued that norms develop to encourage or curtail behaviors that are connected to survival, on either an individual level (Sherif, 1936) or a group level (Campbell, 1975; Pepitone, 1976; Sumner, 1906). From this perspective, the content of norms is neither arbitrary nor trivial, since the ability to develop and communicate norms is evolutionarily adaptive and aids in our survival as a species (Allison, 1992; Campbell, 1975; Schaller & Latane, 1996). We are a group-living species (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Hogan, 1982; Sumner, 1906) and, as such, have been selected for our ability to understand and imitate rules that are commonly observed in the immediate environment (Allison, 1992). Whether adaptive social behavior evolves via genetic (Allison, 1992; Campbell, 1975) or cultural (Bonner, 1980; Campbell, 1975; Lumsden, 1988) mechanisms, norms are credited with maintaining the selfish desires of the individual with the need for social control and collective survival (Campbell, 1975; Freud, 1952; Triandis, 1994).

Schaller and Latané (1996) argue that culturally shared belief systems, such as stereotypes and norms, evolve in a manner that is very similar to the natural selection of species: they emerge through selective pressures on individuals to communicate with others about behavior patterns that are effective, relevant, and informative. That is, successful norms are adaptive in promoting survival-related actions; they communicate behaviors that are useful in acquiring status, affiliating with others, acquiring food or shelter, and mating. Unsuccessful norms lead to inaccurate or incorrect behavior, and like maladaptive genes will neither replicate nor be passed on to subsequent individuals (see also MacNeil & Sherif, 1976). Lumsden (1988) nicely illustrated the distinction between the cultural relativity of norms and their ultimate adaptive significance. He cited cultural anthropologists who had deduced that sibling incest avoidance was “guided by idiosyncratic cultural systems of taboos and rituals” (p. 246). However, sibling incest taboos are a cultural universal, appearing in nearly all societies. Moreover, more recent genetic studies have found that there is a higher frequency of genetic deformity in the offspring of brother-sister matings than in the offspring of nonrelatives. Consistent with this functionalist viewpoint, then, the cultural transmission of a norm against sibling mating actually enhances reproductive success. Campbell (1975) suggests that we, as social psychologists, should approach the study of cultural differences with awe and respect, “certain that behind the bizarre forms lies a functional wisdom that [we] have yet to understand” (p. 105).

This viewpoint provides a framework for integrating the societal-value and functional perspectives on norm development. As noted earlier, there are customs and traditions that are subject to the whims and fancies of the culture in which they appear, implying that there is an overarching need that must be fulfilled, but how that need is fulfilled will vary, depending on the local social culture and physical environment (Sherif, 1936). For example, knowing the availability of a prospective romantic partner is an important first step in initiating a romantic relationship. Tie signs indicating that one is already attached to someone are communicated across a wide variety of cultures; however, those signs (e.g., wedding rings on fingers, dots on the forehead, ankle bracelets, facial tattoos) can vary widely depending on the culture. Greeting rituals are similarly universal, since it is important to be able to distinguish friends from enemies. However, greeting expressions can range from a kiss on the cheek to a handshake to a raised, open palm, depending on the culture. In other words, seemingly idiosyncratic norms that do not fulfill a more ultimate goal, such as acquiring status, maintaining social networks, reproducing, or providing shelter, are unlikely to survive to be passed on to subsequent generations (Schaller & Latané, 1996; Sherif, 1936; Sumner, 1906).

**Norm Transmission** One of the most important characteristics of norms is that they do not exist if they are not shared with others. Those others can be anyone in one’s social sphere, including children, partners, family, friends, coworkers, strangers, the media. However, norms are shared belief systems and must be examined from the perspective of both the individual’s psychological system and the sociocultural system in which that individual is embedded (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Campbell, 1975; McKinnon, 1980; Pepitone, 1976).

The exchange and inculcation of normative behavior can
be accomplished in ways that vary in their level of intentionality. Some rules are transmitted deliberately through active instruction, demonstrations, storytelling, rituals, and so on (Allison, 1992; Lamdan, 1988). For example, some portion of the time that young families spend at religious services will invariably be spent training the toddler to sit quietly throughout the service. Norms can also be expressed more passively, via nonverbal behaviors or imitation (Allison, 1992; Lamdan, 1988). For example, Snow, Jacklin, and Maccoby (1983) found that fathers were more likely to give dolls to their one-year-old daughters than to their sons, a type of subtle encouragement that contributes to sex differences in preferences for play activity among boys and girls (Lyttton & Romney, 1991). Still other norms may be inferred from the behaviors of those around us, without any explicit training or implicit endorsement (Ciardi, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Ciardi, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Rutte, Wilke, & Messick, 1987). Bunk and Bakker (1985) found that perceptions that one's friends engage in extradyadic sexual activity positively affect one's own willingness to engage in it. Regardless of their origin, norms must be communicated to have any effect on behavior.

This critical role of communication is emphasized by Latané's (1996; Latané, Nowak, & Liu, 1994) dynamic social impact theory. Latané describes society as a "self-organizing complex system composed of interacting individuals each obeying simple principles of social impact" (p. 6). Using the classic components of social impact theory (Latané, 1981; see the section "Conformity" in this chapter), Latané describes how the strength of the source's personal influence, the physical proximity (immediacy) of the influence targets to the source, and the number of sources can account for the clustering of societal phenomena, such as local dialects. Computer simulations that have modeled this "dynamic iterative process of reciprocal and recursive influence" (Latané, 1996, p. 2) have shown that our tendency to be influenced most heavily by those who are closest in physical space produces local agreement about important values and attitudes. The formation of subcultures provides space for less popular elements, but they are smaller in number and remain on the fringes of the dominant group. In this way, society is viewed as a "self-organizing, complex system" in a dynamic environment, as individuals both influence and are influenced by their immediate environment. Although the application of this theory to our understanding of norm transmission awaits empirical testing (see Schaller & Latané, 1996, for a theoretical application to the stereotyping process), it provides one description of the process by which societal norms and local norms not only can spread, but also can come to differ. Although social scientists have used norms as explanatory constructs throughout the twentieth century, the empirical literature specifically studying the emergence and transmission of social norms is exceedingly small.

Laboratory Research on Norm Formation and Transmission Sheriff's (1936) classic studies of how people interpret the autokinetic phenomena provided a laboratory analogue for the emergence of norms in society. The autokinetic effect is a perceptual illusion created by shining a small point of light on a wall in a completely darkened room. In the absence of an external frame of reference, the light appears to move erratically, even though it is held perfectly still. This novel, ambiguous stimulus provided "objectively unstable situations that would permit themselves to be structured in several ways, depending upon the character of the subjectively established reference points" (Sherif, 1936, p. 91). When alone, subjects would establish their own range of movement within the first few trials, and all subsequent trials would be judged with respect to that personal norm. Sherif found that this personal frame of reference remained constant across additional testing sessions. The next step was to determine how the norm was established or changed in a social setting. Half of the participants started in an individual testing format and were then introduced to a group format; for the other half of the participants, this order was reversed. Sherif found that the group exerted a strong influence on the definition of the stimulus. When tested in the group setting first, respondents gave essentially the same estimates of movement, and those estimates remained stable across two additional testing sessions, even though the range of movement varied by group on average one to five inches. When these group participants were subsequently moved into an individual testing situation, they carried the group norm with them. Those participants who started with the individual sessions established widely divergent estimates of movement, varying by as much as seven inches. The divergent estimates converged in the first group session, however, and stayed close for the next two group sessions, although not as close as in the participants who started with the group. On the basis of these results, Sherif (1936) concluded that unstable situations evoke confusion and uncertainty. Under such circumstances, people assume that "the group must be right" (p. 111) and look to the group to establish a common norm. Sherif's research showed how contact with others influences our immediate perceptions of reality. This influence can also be internalized; Rohrer et al. (1954) found that people who were retested individually as much as a year after the norm induction still reported the group norm.

Once established, how are norms perpetuated? Jacobs and Campbell (1961) examined the perseverance of arbitrary cultural norms using the same autokinetic phenomenon. They found that their participants gave the group norm more weight than their individual senses, even when the group adopted an unlikely position. Confederates were instructed to report movement that ranged from fifteen to sixteen inches, even though the average among the control
group was 3.8 inches. In order to determine the persever-
ance of norms, the confederate(s) were rotated out of the
group and replaced by naive participants. Even though not
physically present, the confederate’s influence remained:
the subsequent groups of naive participants continued to
hold the aberrant norm for an average of five generations.
Later research demonstrated that the more arbitrary the
manipulated norm (i.e., seventeen inches versus twelve
inches versus no norm), the more quickly its influence dis-
appeared from the population (MacNeil & Sherif, 1976).

These studies examined the process of developing and
transmitting norms about an ambiguous stimuli, but the
amount of physical movement exhibited by the point of
light does have a “correct” answer. Sherif’s (1936) re-
search on the formation of norms indicated that, in the
absence of an objective rule for behavior, people were most
likely to behave according to the group consensus. In this
sense, the group’s behavior provides a valuable heuristic,
or simple decision rule, about how to act effectively in
the situation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This motivation to
be accurate in our judgments and behavior is evident in a
variety of areas of normative social influence, to which we
now turn.

The Goal of Effective Action

As humans, we are motivated to act in ways that are effect-
ive in achieving our goals: we want to make accurate deci-
sions. White (1959) describes the motivation for compet-
ence as “an organism’s capacity to interact effectively
with its environment” (p. 297). He further argues that in-
terest in accurately perceiving and dealing with our en-
vironment is an adaptive strategy that is present from birth
(in the form of focal attention and object perception), and
that this “effectance” motivation goes beyond object man-
ipulation to exploration of the social environment, in
order to understand and interact effectively with others.

Descriptive Norms One source of evidence that people
look to when trying to maximize the effectiveness of their
social behavior is the descriptive norm operating in the sit-
uation (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Cialdini, Reno,
& Kallgren, 1990; Schaffer, 1983). Descriptive norms are
derived from what other people do in any given situation.
Watching others provides information about what is “nor-
mal” in a novel or ambiguous situation (Gilbert, 1995;
Stiff, 1994). When the appropriate behavior is unclear, we
tend to rely on “social reality” as displayed by others (Fes-
tinger, 1954). In addition, others’ behavior provides con-
sensus information: the greater the number of people who
respond to the same situation in the same way, the more
correct we will perceive the behavior to be (Thibaut & Kel-
ley, 1959). A wide variety of research shows that the be-
behavior of others in our social environment shapes our own
interpretation of and response to a situation, even without
overt indoctrination; for example, Milgram, Bickman, and
Berlewicz (1969) were able to induce 84 percent of pedes-
trians passing a city street corner to gaze up into space at
nothing by simply having a group of confederates model the
behavior. According to Cialdini (1993), when we perceive
sufficient social support for a particular behavior, we
follow others’ leads because this heuristic of “social
proof” saves us time and cognitive effort while providing an
outcome that has a high probability of being effective.

We are most likely to use the evidence of others’ behav-
ior to decide the most effective course of action when the
situation is novel, ambiguous, or uncertain (Sherif, 1936;
see also Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Tesser, Campbell, &
Mickler, 1983), and especially when the source of refer-
ence is similar to us (Festinger, 1954). We can maximize
the effectiveness of this tendency to model our behaviors
after others if we follow those who are not only similar to
us, but successful as well. It would not be adaptive to ran-
donely follow just anyone in our environment. Rather,
those who successfully model effective behavior will have
an advantage over those who do not. As noted by Allison
(1992), “Imitation may be ubiquitous but it is not indis-
criminate” (p. 284); and people should be more likely to
imitate those who have visible signs of success, such as
wealth, power, or status.

In an effort to determine the effects of descriptive norms
on behavior, Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren (1990) designed
a series of studies in natural settings to examine littering
behavior. These investigators manipulated the descriptive
norm for littering behavior by controlling the amount of
litter in a variety of environments (e.g., a parking garage, an
amusement park); the environment was either clean (anti-
littering descriptive norm) or littered (pro-littering des-
criptive norm). Subjects were always conveniently provided a
handbill to toss (with, for example, a reminder to drive
carefully). In general, the first few studies supported the
importance of descriptive norms in eliciting norm-consist-
tent behavior, regardless of whether the norm was either
pro- or anti-littering: people tended to litter significantly
more into a littered environment than into a clean environ-
ment. This tendency was particularly strong when subjects’
attention was directed to the descriptive norm in the set-
ing. When a confederate littered into an already littered
environment, thereby focusing attention on the trash-
seting, people were most likely to litter. When the confede-
rate littered into a clean environment, however, thereby
highlighting the lack of litter, people littered less than they
did when there was a clean environment with no confede-
rate modeling littering. (See the section “Goal Conflict: The
Role of Norm Salience” later in this chapter for a more
complete discussion of the importance of focus in explain-
ing the relationship between norms and behavior.)

The role of ambiguity in seeking social proof informa-
tion is clearly illustrated in Latané and Darley's research on the circumstances that affect bystander intervention during emergencies (Latané & Darley, 1968a, 1968b; Latané & Nida, 1981). They were intrigued by the popular attributions given for the lethal inaction of Kitty Genovese's neighbors, thirty-eight of whom listened while she was brutally beaten and stabbed in three separate attacks over the course of thirty-five minutes in the dead of night, no one calling the police until after she had been murdered. The popular press attributed her death to the widespread apathy and alienation that consumes the humanity of anyone who lives in a city the size of New York. Latané and Darley hypothesized, however, that her murder had less to do with New York residents' apathy than with the fact that so many neighbors obviously heard her pleas for help. The residents were looking for evidence that other neighbors had defined the situation as an emergency; finding no evidence that anything was amiss, their "pluralistic ignorance" cost Genovese her life. Subsequent research has repeatedly shown that, when alone, bystanders to emergencies almost always help; but in the presence of others who are not moving to help, most people withhold assistance (Batson, 1998, in this Handbook; Latané & Nida, 1981).

Although not specifically manipulating norms as descriptive per se, a variety of other social influence phenomena are consistent with the "social proof as information toward right living" interpretation. Several years ago, a small New Jersey town was suddenly plagued with the deaths of several teenagers, all of whom had taken their own lives. Parents and school officials feared that the town's children had entered into a secret death pact that would eventually decimate their youth population. According to the research on suicide imitation, however, a conspiracy theory was not needed to explain why the teenagers were killing themselves. Instead, all that was needed was an understanding of the power of social proof to legitimize suicide as a method for dealing with the troubles of life. Phillips (1974) first dubbed the phenomenon the "Werther effect," after the effect of Goethe's 1774 novel, The Sorrows of Young Werther. At the end of the story, Werther commits suicide, and the popular book's publication spurred a rash of imitative suicides across Europe. Not simply the products of their time, similar social phenomena have been noted after the suicide deaths of Marilyn Monroe in 1962 and Yukiko Okada, a popular Japanese singer, in 1986 (UPI, April 23, 1986). Phillips and his colleagues, among others, have looked at monthly and daily fluctuations in the suicide rate both before and after publicized deaths (Phillips, 1974; Phillips & Carstensen, 1986). They have found increases in suicides following front-page suicide stories in the news; the copies of suicides were clustered in the geographical region where the publicized suicide occurred, and the increase was evident even after the data were corrected for seasonal effects and a linear increase in suicide frequency. Although others have argued that the effect holds only for the publicized suicides of American entertainers and political celebrities (Kessler et al., 1983; Stack, 1987). Stack (1990) found significant increases after both celebrity and noncelebrity suicides, but larger increases after celebrity suicides. Jonas (1992) recently found similar evidence following the suicides of prominent citizens over a twelve-year period in a region of West Germany. The effect also holds for highly publicized media portrayals of fictional suicides in television movies and regular programming (Berman, 1988; Platt, 1987; Schmidtke & Hafner, 1988). Moreover, while the method of suicide chosen by the imitators may not always be obviously self-inflicted, it is nonetheless lethal. Phillips (1979) also found that, immediately following front-page coverage of a suicide, the number of people who died in commercial-airline crashes jumped by 1,000 percent. A corresponding jump was also found in the number of single-passenger automobile fatalities (Phillips, 1980).

Phillips (1989) argues that people imitate famous suicides because the ensuing media coverage demonstrates that, rather than being punished, the deceased is accorded attention and status not conferred in life. Therefore, the social stigma associated with suicide is lifted, and the resulting disinhibition allows those who have previously curbed their suicidal tendencies to follow through with their suppressed plans. Additional evidence indicates not only that the publicizing of suicides may make suicide appear to be an effective solution to current problems, but that the underlying causal mechanism may include the social proof of similarity as well (Cialdini, 1993). People are most likely to commit a copycat suicide when the precipitating suicide is committed by someone who is similar in age or sex. For instance, Schmidtke and Hafner (1988), who examined suicides after a German TV series showed a male adolescent committing suicide by throwing himself in the path of a train, found a reliable increase in suicides committed in that manner, primarily among adolescent males. Phillips (1980) analyzed the match between the precipitating suicide victim and the car crash victim(s), and found that newspaper stories that report suicide victims who died alone produce an increase in the frequency of single-fatality wrecks only, whereas stories reporting suicide-plus-murder incidents produce an increase in multiple-fatality wrecks only. Moreover, for those who died in single-car crashes, the ages of the copycat victims were similar to the ages of the precipitating suicide victim. Apparently, the principle of social proof is sufficiently powerful that it can legitimize the suicidal behavior of a similar person, allowing troubled individuals to take not only their own lives, but sometimes the lives of innocent others as well.

Another area in which descriptive norms present a particularly potent, and potentially damaging, form of social


The Goal of Building and Maintaining Social Relationships

As noted earlier, our ancestors may have started to wear clothing for protection against the elements, but choosing to clothe oneself in a colorful serape rather than an equally colorful baseball jersey has more to do with fitting in with the local customs than with the need for protection. Similarly, some teenagers forgo their friends’ offers to use drugs because they know that, if caught, their parents would ground them until emancipation. Other teenagers, however, accept those same offers from friends because using drugs makes them accepted as “one of the crowd” (Alberts et al., 1991; Newcomb et al., 1988). Besides clarifying reality, then, social norms have the power to influence because they clarify the behaviors that are expected of us by those in our social world. In this section we will examine types of norms that go beyond simply describing appropriate behavior to prescribing it, as well as prescribing inappropriate behavior.

Injunctive Norms The “norm” construct is most popularly used to refer to behaviors that are accompanied by social acceptance or disapproval by others (Allison, 1992; Opp, 1982). According to Cialdini, Kallgren, and Reno (1991), these injunctive norms “characterize the perception of what most people approve or disapprove” (p. 203). They specify what “should” be done and therefore the moral rules of the group. Injunctive norms motivate behavior by promising social rewards or punishments for it. For example, one reason we may feel obligated to help others is that a societal norm prescribes socially responsible behavior (Batson, 1998, in this Handbook; Berkowitz, 1972; Staub, 1972). Likewise, the norm of reciprocity dictates that a stranger or mere acquaintance who does us a favor expects to be able to “call in” that favor when he or she has a simi-
lar need (Gouldner, 1960; for a fuller discussion of reciprocity, see the section "Compliance" later in this chapter.) Injunctive norms can take the form of laws, but our discussion is limited to illustrative norms that are enforced by social sanctions, not legal actions.

An early study in the social psychology of normative influence arose out of a naturally unfolding situation at Bennington College, where Theodore Newcomb was a faculty member. Newcomb (1943) describes the power of injunctive norms to confer popularity and social status. Bennington College was a newly established women's college in New Hampshire when Newcomb was a member of the faculty in the late 1930s. The women who attended the university came from the privileged East Coast establishment and brought their parents' conservative political views with them. A norm favoring left-wing politics emerged among the young and liberal faculty members. The norm spread into the student population and was embraced by the more popular women on campus. Newcomb's analysis indicates that, over time, the norm was not only associated with greater popularity, but the more advanced students began to sanction the newer students who did not express left-wing sentiments.

More recent research indicates that injunctive norms need not be expressed in order to direct behavior, and that the reward of popularity is sufficiently powerful to elicit even health-threatening behavior. Crandall (1988) examined the prevalence of binge eating among sorority sisters to try to determine whether the high rate of bulimia was due to individual predispositions or to a more general social influence operating on a group level. In both sororities studied, binge eating increased among members during their first year in the house. In one sorority, the level of binging was positively correlated with popularity; that is, the most popular and well-connected women in the sorority also binged more. Consistent with the notion that we develop local norms for behavior, the most popular members of the second sorority binged only a moderate amount; those at either extreme (too much or too little binging) were less popular. In both cases, however, the amount that these women binged moved toward the average of their friendship network over time. Even though the social approval ascribed to binging behavior was not explicitly taught or encouraged, the relationship between binging and popularity was clear.

Since the beginning of the environmental movement in the late 1960s, an antilittering norm has been an integral aspect of the American collective conscience (Cialdini, Kaligren, & Reno, 1991, Study 5). Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren (1990, Study 5) investigated the effects of priming either an antilittering norm or other norms that varied in their conceptual closeness to littering (recycling, energy conservation, water awareness, and support for local museums). They activated the norm by placing a handbill with a corresponding message (e.g., "April is Keep Arizona Beautiful Month. Please Do Not Litter.") under the wind-shield wiper of library patrons' cars while they were in the building. The parking lot was lightly littered, and unobtrusive observers recorded patrons' littering when they returned to their cars. When the antilittering norm was primed, only 10 percent of the handbills were thrown on the ground. As the message's conceptual distance from littering increased, so did actual littering; in the nonnormative (support local museums) condition, 25 percent of the handbills were thrown to the ground. An elaborate follow-up study strengthened the priming effect through perceptual narrowing by manipulating physical arousal and found a similar trend in the arousal condition (Kaligren, Cialdini, & Reno, 1989).

Some researchers have subsumed the antilittering norm under a larger injunctive norm, the norm of social responsibility (Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993). The social responsibility norm is an expectation that people should help those who need help, without expecting or requesting repayment (Berkowitz, 1972). This norm mandates not only that we help those who depend on others for their welfare, such as children and the elderly, but that we have a sense of obligation for the welfare of humanity in general (Staub, 1972; Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993). Although wanting to show that people are socially responsible simply because it makes them feel good, Berkowitz and his colleagues have had difficulty demonstrating that people help others without thinking about the possible consequences (such as rewards) (Batson, 1998, in this Handbook; Berkowitz, 1972). For example, Berkowitz and Lutterman (1968) measured individuals' knowledge of the norm and found that those who were high on social responsibility tended to do whatever they perceived their social group thought was right, rather than being motivated by a sense of obligation to others in general.

Given that approval by others is one of the underlying goals of socially responsible behavior, the source of influence should have a marked effect on our felt obligation to follow the norm of social responsibility. Accordingly, a similar source can trigger normative behavior more easily than a dissimilar source, as illustrated in research by Horstein, Fisch, and Holmes (1968). They placed wallets on the ground in randomly distributed spots around midtown Manhattan. All of the wallets contained the same amount of money, owner identification, and a letter. The content of the letter was the only variable in the study. In all cases, the letter indicated that the wallet had been lost once before, leading one to conclude that it must have been dropped this time by the person who was attempting to return it to its original owner. The author of the letter is what varied: the first good samaritan was either obviously American (and therefore similar to the new samaritan) or obviously a recent immigrant. The second samaritans clearly were af-
The similarity of the letter writer: twice as many I the lead of the similar American in returning the s did those exposed to the socially responsible ex-
rovided by the dissimilar foreigner.

effective norms are pervasive and powerful. Although chosen to explain normative social influence using w illustrations, we can list other norms that are int, such as the incest taboo, respect for elders, and us against unprovoked aggression. Knowing how eive others' expectations for us is important in un-
fing how those perceptions influence our behavior, abim and Ajzen (1975) argued that in order to pre-
vior, we must also express our willingness to go ith those expectations.

Five Norms Fishbein and Ajzen (1975; Ajzen & n, 1980) developed the theory of reasoned action as use to assertions that the concept of attitudes was turribly useful in predicting behavior (Festinger, Nicker, 1969; for a fuller discussion, see Petty & r, 1998, in this Handbook). In addition to tackling measurement issues, such as matching attitude and or specificity (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1998, in this ook), they argued that part of the difficulty in pre-
behavior from attitudes was that an important det of behaviors and behavioral intentions had to be ed with attitude valence: subjective norms. A su-
norm is "the person's perception that most people e important to him think he should or should not n the behavior in question" (Fishbein & Ajzen, p. 302). We can assess subjective norms directly by people to describe their perceptions of the injunc-
ms held by the people whose opinions matter most, as well as their willingness to follow these direct-
measuring subjective norms, then, requires people to y the referents whose opinions are important, do the referents' expectations for their behavior, and scribe the extent to which they are willing to com-
th with those norms. For instance, in predicting the likeli-
that people will donate blood, it is necessary to meas-
not only how strongly they believe in the necessity of ng blood (their own attitudes), but also their percep-
of their friends' and families' expectations regarding blood donations (their referents' expectations abou
ating blood), and the extent to which they want to y with these expectations. These two components, es and subjective norms, are then weighted and com-
to form an individual's behavioral intention, which is o predict behavior.

Attitudes have traditionally been weighted most heavily cululating behavioral intentions (Sheppard, Hartwick, rshaw, 1988), possibly because most of the research ued on measuring individual behaviors in relatively t settings (Stiff, 1994). Some behaviors are more sus-
ceptible to social influence, however, and therefore more strongly determined by subjective norms (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). For instance, Fishbein (1966) found that under-
graduate men's likelihood of engaging in promarital sexual activity was more heavily determined by the expectations of their families and closest friends than by their attitudes toward promarital sex. More recently, Fishbein et al. (1993) found that men in well-organized gay communities perceived more social pressure and had stronger intentions to avoid risky sexual activities than those in a less-orga
ized community. For heterosexual students in one study, peer norms were a stronger influence on AIDS-related sexual risk-taking behavior than was knowledge or efficacy (Winslow, Franzini, & Hwang, 1992). In a prisioner's dilemma game, subjective norms were more important under conditions of cooperation than in competitive situations (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1970). Finally, the level of risk affected the extent to which people followed their attitudes or their subjective norms in expressing their intentions to wear seat belts (Tafelm and Fishbein, 1994).

Some criticisms have been leveled at the theory of reasoned action; for example, the fact that the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Fredericks & Dossett, 1983) is not included in the model. Ajzen (1985, 1991; Ajzen & Madden, 1986) has also acknowleded that not all social behavior is under complete voli-
tional control and added a perceived behavioral control component to the model, calling his revision the theory of planned behavior. More recent evidence indicates that some people may be more normatively controlled than others (Tafelm and Finlay, 1996). Nonetheless, combining the press of social norms with the strength of attitudes has been shown to predict behavior better than using attitudes alone. For those behaviors particularly susceptible to peer pressure, such as adolescent drug use and sexual behavior, identifying the social norms of important referent people and one's willingness to comply with those expectations can be an important intervention tool.

Social Norms and Relationships One of the advantages of being social creatures is that we enjoy not only the company of those in our social environment, but also their assistance in meeting our material needs. A variety of findings indicate that two different social norms govern how we allocate goods and services to our close friends and relatives, as opposed to strangers or acquaintances (Clark & Mills, 1979, 1993). An extensive program of research by Clark and Mills has characterized our distributive justice norm for formal or short-term partners as based in exchange principles, while the distributive justice norm that guides our interactions with long-term and intimate relational partners is characterized as being more communal (for a review, see Clark & Pataki, 1995).

The two types of relationships can be distinguished by
the level of felt obligation for helping and repayment. People in communal relationships feel a special responsibility for meeting the needs of their partners, giving assistance as the person needs it, without expectation of specific repayment. In exchange relationships, on the other hand, there is no felt obligation to meet the other's needs, and any assistance is expected either to satisfy a past favor or to ensure a comparable benefit at some point in the future. People in exchange relationships keep track of what they put into the relationship and are sensitive to the balance of inputs and outcomes in the relationship (Clark, 1984). Partners in communal relationships express more attention to the other's needs, respond more positively to those needs, help more, and feel better after having given that help. In fact, people in communal relationships actively avoid calculating the level of equitable exchange in the relationship and express dissatisfaction if a communal partner tries to reciprocate in a tit-for-tat fashion.

Making distinctions between communal and exchange relationships can be functional in acquiring necessary resources (Roloff et al., 1988). Clark (1992) has suggested that our interdependence is so vital to our welfare that engaging in communal relationships may confer a survival advantage. Those we consider to be our intimate friends and family are the most likely to ask us for assistance: according to one study, 57 percent of daily persuasion attempts involved seeking resources, such as information, objects, and assistance; and 64 percent of those persuasion attempts were aimed at close friends and family (Rule, Biesanz, & Kohn, 1985). We also feel more compelled either to fulfill a request, or to offer assistance in the absence of a request, for friends rather than for strangers (Roloff et al., 1988). Intimacy can also affect our ability to resist harmful social influence. People report being more receptive to the opinions of their partners and friends than to those of their family when it comes to adopting safer sex intentions (Gallois et al., 1992). Fishbein et al. (1993) found that gay men report less social pressure and fewer intentions to avoid risky sexual behavior with a steady partner than with an occasional or one-time partner.

In this section, we have explored the effects of others' expectations or social norms on our behavior. As noted, we are a group-living species and need to develop social networks in order to acquire resources and social support. These tendencies should make us particularly attentive to the behaviors that are approved by our chosen groups. Although most people would argue that these norms tend to be pervasive and well known, the extent to which injunctive norms actually guide behavior depends on whether or not individuals have internalized the norm, not just learned it (Staub, 1972). Once a norm has been internalized, it becomes integrated into one's self-concept, and future normative behavior represents conforming to one's own expectations of self, leading to feelings of self-esteem or self-approval ( Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). This distinction between the power of self-approval and the power of external social rewards to guide behavior has led Schwartz (1977) to argue that more general social norms have little pull on behavior beyond that exercised by one's own, internalized norms. We will turn next to a discussion of how personal norms may help us maintain a desirable self-concept, thereby fulfilling a different goal than those addressed by the descriptive and injunctive norms already discussed.

The Goal of Managing Self-concept

People have a basic need to evaluate themselves positively and to feel good about who they are (Leary, 1995; Steele, 1988). We engage in a variety of defensive maneuvers in order to maintain a positive self-esteem and sense of self-worth: the self-serving attributional bias (Ross & Serow, 1979), false consensus (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), self-handicapping (Berglas & Jones, 1978), and downward social comparisons (Wills, 1981), for example. One of the primary motivations for engaging in socially responsible behavior may be our desire to see ourselves as good, kind, and helpful people. From this perspective, we help others in order to be consistent with our self-image or self-expectations (Berkowitz, 1972; Schwartz, 1977).

Schwartz (1977; Schwartz & Howard, 1982) argues that the threat of external social sanctions is not necessary to elicit norm-based behavior. His normative conceptualization of altruism proposes that we have personal norms, self-based standards or expectations for behavior that flow from our internalized values. Although these norms may arise from shared expectations in social interactions, personal norms are enforced through the anticipation of self-enhancement or self-deprecation; that is, they are self-reinforcing. Both the standards and the sanctions for activating normative behavior are located within the self. One acts so as to be consistent with one's own values in order to "enhance or preserve one's sense of self-worth and avoid self-concept distress" (Schwartz, 1977, p. 226). Accordingly, Schwartz found that people who were more aware of the consequences of their behavior for others and who had difficulty denying responsibility for their behavior also behaved more altruistically. In an attempt to study the effects of personal norms on littering behavior, Cialdini, Kallgren, and Reno (1991, Study 9) selected study participants who had either a strong or a weak personal norm toward littering. They then provided an opportunity to litter a piece of messy paper towel that was a by-product of the irrelevant experiment and found that enhancing the objective self-awareness of those who had strong personal norms against littering dramatically decreased the likelihood than the participants would litter into a littered environment. Those with weak personal norms littered at the rate of control.
group participants who were focused either on a monitor showing random patterns or on experimenters who were monitoring them while they were performing behaviors that were irrelevant to the littering norm.

Although Schwartz (1977) clearly states that social norms make an insignificant contribution to behavior beyond the influence of personal norms, others have been more circumspect (Allison, 1992; Berkowitz, 1972; Cialdini, Kalgren, & Reno, 1991; Staub, 1972; Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993). In fact, there may be multiple, and even incompatible, norms vying for attention in many situations, and our actions may depend to a large extent on the type of norm that is triggered by the context.

**Goal Conflict: The Role of Norm Salience**

Those who have been skeptical about the ability of social norms to reliably account for behavior (e.g., Darley & Latane, 1970; Krebs, 1970; Krebs & Miller, 1985) have noted that a variety of social norms may apply to any specific situation, some of which may be mutually incompatible (e.g., the norm for assisting others even when they have not requested our help versus the norm to stay out of others' business). This competition between norms (Allison, 1992) opens the possibility that any behavior could be attributed to the same mediating construct. Staub (1972) argued that every situation has a multiplicity of both general norms and situational cues that can trigger the appropriate behavior for that situation.

The idea that situational signals might activate one norm over another (Berkowitz, 1972; McKirnan, 1980; Schwartz, 1977) was systematically assessed by Cialdini and his colleagues in their development of the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct (Cialdini, Kalgren, & Reno, 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kalgren, 1990). They hypothesized that a norm would not direct behavior unless it was made salient in the situation. Whether a personal norm, descriptive norm, or injunctive norm would ultimately guide behavior would depend on which one was activated in the setting. These investigators found that making the injunctive norm salient decreased littering, regardless of the state of the environment. Activating the descriptive norm, however, decreased littering in a clean environment only: if the area was already littered, those who saw someone else drop trash were as likely to do so as those in the control condition. Further evidence that injunctive norms, when activated, are more generalizable than descriptive norms came from a subsequent study. Cialdini, Kalgren & Reno (1991) manipulated whether or not the model's behavior was observed in the same environment as the littering opportunity: activating the descriptive norm decreased littering only when it occurred in the same situation as the littering opportunity; activating the injunctive norm decreased littering in both the same and a different environment. As noted earlier, Cialdini, Kalgren, & Reno (1991) found that by making people self-aware they could enhance the likelihood that those with a strong personal norm against littering would not litter. In the same study, some of the participants heard stories of people being sanctioned for antienvironmental behavior. Priming this injunctive norm reduced the tendency to litter for both groups (strong or weak personal norms). This series of studies indicates that, at any given time, an individual's behavior is likely to flow with the norm that is currently focal, even when other types of norms might be relevant and even contrary in the situation.

The relative strength of the three different types of norms to activate behavior may vary with the topic of influence and the social milieu. Cialdini, Kalgren, and Reno (1991) suggested that, when in doubt, anyone who wanted to activate socially beneficial behavior should use procedures that activate injunctive social norms, since these norms appeared to be more general and more cross-situationally effective. On the other hand, Buunk and Bakker (1995, Study 2) found that the extent to which people's friends engaged in extradyadic sexual relations (descriptive norm) was an independent predictor of their own extradyadic sexual willingness, and more potent than whether or not their friends would approve of their engaging in such behavior (injunctive norm). Stalans, Kinsey, and Smith (1991) investigated taxpayers' norms about cheating on tax returns and found that the dominant norm depended on the potential cheaters' confidants. Participants reported that coworkers and friends supported cheating by providing descriptive information on the ineffectiveness of Internal Revenue Service enforcement procedures, thereby decreasing guilt for cheating. Family members, on the other hand, espoused injunctive norms that supported the fairness of tax laws and compliance with them, thereby increasing the likelihood of feeling guilty for cheating.

In a similar vein, Stern, Dietz, and Kalof (1993) argue that environmental protection practices may reflect any of three value orientations (or some combination): an egoistic orientation (protecting the environment to decrease negative consequences for oneself), a social-altruistic orientation (protecting the environment to benefit others), or a biospheric orientation (protecting the environment to benefit nonhuman species and/or the biosphere itself). They found that all three motivations were important in predicting intentions to become involved in political action geared toward preserving the environment. Two behavioral intentions were also measured—willingness to pay for environmental protection through income or through gasoline taxes—and egoistic motivation (consequences for self) was the strongest predictor of willingness to give money. Stern, Dietz, and Kalof argue that asking people to forgo money in favor of environmental quality focuses attention on per-
sonal sacrifice, thereby triggering the egoistic motivation as opposed to the other two.

The idea that norms might combine to trigger behavior is an important area for further research. For instance, descriptive-norm information can work to make salient the appropriate injunctive norm. Aronson and O'Leary (1982–1983) found that they could increase compliance with a water conservation norm from 6 percent to 49 percent by having a model in the men's locker room turn off the shower while he soaped up. Influence was increased to 67 percent when two models soaped up without shower water. Antinormative behavior can sometimes be used to trigger beneficial actions as well. In a study by Macaulay (1970), a model's placing money in a donation box significantly increased the amount of money donated by observers as compared to a no-model condition (again, the descriptive norm triggered the injunctive norm). However, when a model loudly proclaimed unwillingness to donate to the charity, priming a descriptive norm not to donate, donations again increased over the control condition. Apparently, the loud objection activated the injunctive norm, as opposed to the descriptive norm, leading to greater generosity rather than less. In general, it appears that the key to predicting a person's normative behavior is to determine that person's focus of attention within an interconnected and multilevel matrix of norms (Claidini, Kaligren, & Reno, 1991).

Summary: Social Norms

This section of the chapter has provided an overview of theories and research aimed at understanding why social norms develop, as well as how and when they influence behavior. We have argued that norms exert the greatest influence when conditions are uncertain, when the source is similar to us, or when we are particularly concerned about establishing or maintaining a relationship with the source. In addition, we have described several different types of normative influence, including influence based on how others act, influence based on what others condone, and influence based on our own internal standards and sanctions for good conduct. Acknowledging that several different norms may apply in any given situation, we have argued that the most salient of focal norm will have the greatest influence on behavior. In the next section, we address how the three goals we have identified can affect when we will and will not conform to the behaviors of others.

CONFORMITY

The initial interest in conformity behavior was rooted in the earliest social psychological research on suggestibility (Asch, 1948; Moscovici, 1985). Charcot's hypnosis work with hysterical patients in the late 1800s had been transported into the realm of social behavior, and evidence accrued showing that people held positions that were not based on sufficient information, acted in ways that were contrary to the obvious facts of reality, and followed sometimes outlandish group behavior, even when it contradicted the individual's personal position (Asch, 1948). Critical of this perspective, Asch (1956) began a line of research that he expected would invalidate the seemingly overwhelming effect of suggestibility on individual behavior and dispel the notion that humans are “like sheep.” Contrary to expectations, his research on the objective judgments of line length became compelling evidence of human conformity to group pressure (Moscovici, 1985). The purpose of this section is to review the theories and illustrative research that have developed since that time regarding conformity and independence.

Definitions of conformity have been varied and contested (see Allen, 1965; Levine & Russo, 1987; Nair, 1986; Willits, 1963, 1965). Most of the literature on conformity distinguishes it from normative behavior by applying the criterion of movement from one's own position to a contradictory position; that is, the individual's personal position is contrary to that expressed by a comparison other or group (Asch, 1956). Thus, we conform to others when perceived or real pressure from them causes us to act differently from how we would act if alone (Kiesler & Kiesler, 1969; Myers, 1996). Note, however, that even though most of the research deals with conforming to contrary positions, ”conformity by omission” (Sorrels & Kelley, 1984)—that is, failing to behave in a certain way because the group would not approve of such behavior—is also possible.

Given our focus on goal-directed behavior, it is important to discuss why we conform. As noted earlier in the section “Social Norms,” Deutsch and Gerard (1955) distinguished between two different motivations for conforming: informational influence represents conformity to others' positions when the concern is to make accurate and valid judgments; normative influence, on the other hand, represents conformity when the concern is to seek social approval from others or social harmony with others. In addition, Deutsch and Gerard note that conforming to our own self-expectations can enhance feelings of self-esteem or self-approval, while nonconformity can lead to feelings of anxiety or guilt. In the sections that follow, we will consider the evidence concerning when people conform and how conformity can facilitate achievement of the goals of behaving effectively, building and maintaining social relationships, and managing self-concept.

The Goal of Effective Action

Although conformity typically carries a negative connotation in Western culture, it can be an effective and time-sav-
ing strategy. Group consensus is typically the most direct route to goal attainment (Festinger, 1950). Moreover, consensus provides an easy heuristic about how to act, because consensus implies correctness (Cialdini, 1993). When one disagrees with several seemingly independent sources who all hold the same position, and there are no other plausible explanations for the discrepancy (e.g., they have not been paid to lie), it is reasonable to assume that they are more likely to be correct (Asch, 1955; Mackie, 1987; Ross, Bierbrauer, & Hoffman, 1976; Wilder, 1977, 1978). This conflict of perceptions may be particularly acute when the judgment appears to be a relatively simple perceptual task, as in the experimental paradigm developed by Solomon Asch (1956).

Research following Sherif’s (1936) autokinetic studies had been aimed primarily at demonstrating “slavish submission to group pressure” (Asch, 1956, p. 2). Asch believed that people’s apparent “suggestibility” to the inaccurate perceptions of other group members was based in a rational assessment of the situation and a conclusion that their own judgment was impaired. Given the ambiguous nature of the autokinetic stimulus, he reasoned that providing people with a clearly correct position would allow them to remain independent of the group’s inaccurate judgments. Male participants were therefore recruited to participate in a visual discrimination task. Participants were asked to announce publicly which one of three comparison lines matched a standard length. Although seven to nine men participated in each session, only one was a naive participant; the others were instructed to answer correctly on the first two trials, then to respond unanimously and incorrectly to the remaining trials (with the exception of four other accurate trials interspersed among them). The target’s seating position allowed him to hear the responses of all but one participant before giving his response.

To put the results in proper perspective it is important to note that, without any group present, individuals who wrote their judgments on a piece of paper without knowing the others’ answers were accurate more than 99 percent of the time. In contrast, participants made errors in 36.8 percent of the trials in the public condition, and only 24 percent of the targets answered accurately completely throughout the series (compared to 95 percent of the control participants). Of the 76 percent who adopted the majority judgment at least once, one-third went along with a clearly wrong answer on eight to twelve out of twelve possible conformity trials. In extensive postexperiment interviews, participants mentioned that they had gone along with the majority because they felt the majority had to be right and they had to be wrong, to the point of imagining that they had misunderstood the instructions (e.g., they should be judging width instead of length) or that their eyesight had gone bad. One subject went along with the majority on all trials but steadfastly stood by the accuracy of his perceptions. Although this person clearly confirmed to appear correct, others knew they were giving the wrong answers but went along with the majority so as not to feel alone or different from the group (conformity that more clearly fulfills the goal of maintaining social relationships).

In other words, those who conformed did so to meet both social and accuracy goals. Asch (1956) himself interpreted the results as evidence of conformity due to an informational conflict between one’s own senses and the perceptions of others.

Other researchers modified the procedure so that participants responded anonymously (e.g., Crutchfield, 1955; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Even so, those giving anonymous positions reported more errors than those responding alone, indicating that “the judgments of others are taken to be a more or less trustworthy source of information about the objective reality” (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955, p. 634). Crutchfield (1955) found that participants used the group as a reference point for objective reality. Although the participants conformed on tasks ranging from perceptual to opinion items, the most significant act of conformity (79 percent confirmed) occurred when participants were asked to complete a number series that appeared to have a correct answer but was actually insoluble. Also, when the experimenter verified the accuracy of the group’s objective judgments (even though they were wrong), the participants discriminated those tasks from the opinion tasks, showing stronger conformity on succeeding objective tasks but not on the opinion tasks (which elicited normal levels of conformity).

Subsequent researchers have uncovered other factors that influence the level of conformity exhibited in similar studies. Unanimity of the majority is a critical component; having just one other participant give an accurate alternative some or all of the time significantly decreases errors made by the targets (Asch, 1955; Morris & Miller, 1975). Manipulating the perception of group cohesion affects errors; for example, participants try to support the group response when a reward is offered for the best group performance (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). On the other hand, a person who is not accepted by the group exhibits less conformity when a reward is offered for group performance. With no social rewards to be gained, an outcast has more to lose from conforming than from trying to steer the group toward an accurate and reward-worthy response (Kelley & Shapiro, 1954).

Private responses also elicit less conformity than public, face-to-face, or simulated group responses (Argyle, 1957; Asch, 1956; Campbell & Fairey, 1989; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Levy, 1960; Mouton, Blake, & Olmstead, 1956). Deutsch and Gerard (1955) had some of their participants write down their own perceptions before being exposed to the inaccurate group response. Prior commitment, especially when the participants expected the experimenter to see the initial judgment, dramatically reduced the number of errors. Even writing the individual response
on an anonymous piece of paper or an erasable "magic pad" decreased the error rate over a no-commitment condition. Kelley and Shapiro (1954) also found support for the effectiveness of prior commitment on reducing conformity to contrary evidence. Task difficulty can affect reliance on others' input for making an accurate judgment; greater difficulty elicits more conformity to the group position (Coleman, Blake, & Mouton, 1958). Also, a target who has been made to feel incompetent in his or her judgments prior to group exposure will rely more on the group's judgment than will a competent target (Hochbaum, 1954).

Although Asch (1956) noted individual differences in error rates, these differences were not tied to any other personality or individual-difference variable. Two separate groups emerged in his research: early conformists who continued to conform at a higher rate throughout the remainder of the series, and nonconformists who withstood group disagreement and remained independent throughout the series. As noted earlier, conformity is often a negatively perceived characteristic in our individualistic Western culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Even though the Asch conformity effect is relatively robust, people doubt that they would succumb to the group if placed in a similar situation. When watching others participate in an Asch-like study, observers predicted that they themselves would yield less frequently than would be expected by the research evidence. The observers also predicted that the participants would conform more than they actually did (Wolofsin, Sherman, & Cann, 1975). Apparently they felt that their motivation to be accurate was stronger than the "average" person's motivation to get along with group members.

The size of the group opposing the individual's judgment would also be expected to affect conformity if others were providing informational influence; several independent sources giving the same response should be more informative than one. Accordingly, Asch (1956) found that the amount of conformity increased dramatically as the number of opposing voices grew from one to three, although the influence of additional group members (more than three, up to fifteen), was minimal (a leveling effect replicated by Rosenberg, 1961). Gerard, Wilhelmy, and Conolley (1968) highlighted the independence of the group members' responses, and reported a linear increase in the level of conformity as the group size increased. As already noted, however, just one fellow traveler down the path of defection can nullify the group influence, regardless of the group's size. Group size has been described as just one of the important components in two mathematical models of the conformity process, Latané's (1981) Social Impact Theory (SIT) and Tanford and Penrod's (1984) Social Impact Model (SIM).

Social Impact Latané (1981) describes social impact as the influence of a social force field on a single target. The impact of this force field is a multiplicative function of three elements: strength of the source (salience of the source to the target, e.g., the source's perceived status, credibility, power); the immediacy, or proximity to the target; of the number of people constituting the source of influence. In other words, social influence is a function of the combined strength, immediacy, and number of the source.

In reviewing several exemplars of the conformity literature, Latané notes that the small amount of conformity shown to only one or two opposition members in Asch's data is problematic, since the theory predicts a negatively accelerating, positive power function between group size and conformity. From the perspective of SIT, the first person would be expected to have the greatest amount of impact, with each subsequent source exerting relatively less influence. Gerard, Wilhelmy, and Conolley's (1968) later study provided a better fit with the model, and Latané presents additional evidence on tipping and bystander intervention that supports the model (see also Latané & Wolf, 1981). More recent innovations include the dynamical Social Impact Model already discussed (Latané, 1996).

The SIM (Tanford & Penrod, 1984) was developed shortly after the SIT, and partly in response to it. The SIM also models social influence data, but proposed an S-shaped Gompertz growth curve, as opposed to the SIT's negatively accelerating function. The SIM, therefore, better predicts the Asch data because the second and third sources each contribute more influence than the first, and each subsequent source contributes a smaller amount of influence. Tanford and Penrod's meta-analytic test of the SIM provided a slightly better fit than the SIT to a large number of conformity, deviate rejection, and minority influence research results. The SIM also added parameters to the model, including type of task, source consistency, type of group, and individual differences in susceptibility to influence.

Campbell and Fairey (1989) argued that the difference between the two models could be explained by examination of the underlying processes of informational and normative influence. In a computerized dot estimation task, they manipulated the availability of normative and informational influence by regulating the group size, the number of exposures to the stimulus materials, and the extremity of the error. They found support for the SIT (little difference between the effects of one or three sources) when informational needs were high—that is, when the advocated group position was close to reality or moderately discrepant and when deprived of information (only one exposure to the stimulus). Support for the SIM was strongest when normative influence should be most apparent; that is, the second and third sources exerted more impact than the first only when the group position was obviously wrong and participants had repeated opportunities to scrutinize the stimulus.
Although there is a difference in the precision of the two models' fit to the data, both the STT and the SIM can predict the amount of influence that will be exercised by one source up to many sources, capturing quantitative differences in influence across a variety of influence settings. However, others have argued that, to understand the effects of faction size on influence, it is critical to explain the psychological processes underlying the observed influence in addition to describing the form of the function (Campbell & Fairey, 1989; Chaiken & Stangor, 1987; Levine & Russo, 1987; Maass & Clark, 1984; Maass, West, & Ciardini, 1987). In particular, Serge Moscovici (1976, 1980, 1985; Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972) has advocated the power of a minority to exercise influence, and argued that minorities and majorities do so via different processes.

Majority and Minority Social Influence To counter the "conformity bias" that had characterized social influence research well into the 1960s, Moscovici and his colleagues began a program of research to demonstrate that social influence is a reciprocal process in which both the minority target and the majority source are agents and receivers of influence. From this perspective, a minority is not simply a passive target accepting the influence of the more numerous majority, it also has the ability to challenge the status quo, create conflict and the possibility of innovation as opposed to stagnation. According to Moscovici (1976), a dissenting minority breaks the consensus of the majority, challenging the validity of the majority position and creating a dilemma between risking deviance by accepting the minority's informational advantage (conversion) or maintaining the social support provided by complying with the majority position (compliance). Arguing that minorities and majorities elicit different outcomes, Moscovici (1980, 1985) predicted that they would also trigger distinct social influence processes.

Moscovici's (1980, 1985) dual-process model proposes that a contrary minority, such as the force created in the Asch paradigm, elicits a comparison process for the target of influence, who focuses on the discrepancy between his or her position and that advocated by the more numerous majority. This focus outward on the majority message triggers the need for consensus, producing compliance with (but not internalization of) the majority position. On the other hand, a contrary minority elicits a validation process for the target, who is compelled to examine the accuracy of the minority position critically if the minority presents a realistic, consistent alternative viewpoint. Since the target is scrutinizing a reasonable message, this examination should elicit internalized change. Resolving the conflict between minority and majority influence should take the path of least resistance (Moscovici, 1980). That is, when confronted with a disagreeable majority, it is easier to maintain one's public image by publicly complying with the majority, but not changing one's internal attitude. Publicly agreeing with a deviant minority, however, can damage one's reputation (Mugny, 1982); therefore, it may be easier to change one's internal opinion without voicing it in public.

Moscovici's dual-process model remains controversial (see Kragulski & Mackie, 1990; Latane & Wolf, 1981; Wolf, 1987). Even so, an extensive body of literature has developed in the past twenty-five years supporting Moscovici's contention that numerically inferior minorities can exert influence (for reviews see Levine & Moreland, 1998, in this Handbook; Levine & Russo, 1987; Maass & Clark, 1984; Maass, West, & Ciardini, 1987; Moscovici, 1980, 1985; Moscovici, Mucho-Faina, & Maass, 1994; Nemeth, 1986; Wood et al., 1994). Wood et al.'s (1994) meta-analysis indicates that minorities tend to have more influence on public measures and private, direct measures, while minorities have more influence on private, indirect measures (although minority influence has also been found on direct measures; see Maass & Clark, 1983; Trost, Maass, & Kenrick, 1992). The persistence of minority-induced change has received little research attention.

Although minorities have exerted social influence on opinion judgments (for example, see Maass & Clark, 1983; Mugny, 1975, 1982; Paicheler, 1976, 1977), the original research employed a reversal of the Asch paradigm. Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux (1969) exposed groups of four naive participants to two confederates who consistently announced throughout repeated trials that an obviously blue slide was green. Then the participants were asked to identify the color of the slide themselves, a relatively unambiguously task. Those who were not exposed to minority influence saw one green slide one time (0.25 percent of the trials). One-third of those in the minority influence condition said the slide was green in approximately 8 percent of the trials, a significant increase. Subsequent research has shown that consistency is an essential criterion for eliciting minority influence (Nemeth, Swedlund, & Kanki, 1974): a consistent minority of two is more influential than either a consistent individual or an inconsistent minority (Moscovici & Lage, 1976), and a minority that shifts to a less extreme position has little influence (Kiesler & Pallak, 1975; Paicheler, 1976, 1977).

Although the minority may instigate an informational conflict, when people are instructed to be accurate they tend to rely on the consensus heuristic and the majority position. Moscovici and Lage (1978) directed their participants to focus on generating either an original response or an objective response to the slide color labeling task and found that, as the accuracy goal became more salient, the majority's influence increased (and vice versa for the originality norm). They argued that the majority elicits convergence on the group norm, whereas a dissenting minority elicits innovative responses. Nemeth's (1986) review of her problem-solving studies further illustrates that a minority
voice frees the target to respond to objective tasks in creative ways that diverge from the majority position.

The desire to be accurate in our choices and behaviors makes us susceptible to influence from sources that create a conflict between their perceptions and ours. We have reviewed a variety of perspectives and factors that address when and how that clash will result in informational social influence. Throughout the discussion, however, it has been clear that the desire to conform in order to receive acceptance and approval can also be strong enough to cause us to deny our own perceptions. We now turn to research relevant to this second goal.

The Goal of Building and Maintaining Social Relationships

The social rewards of conformity can be many, as evidenced by what happens to nonconformists: people who deviate from the group consensus are disliked, rejected, and unwanted (see Levine, 1980, for a review). The dress, hairstyle, or mannerisms of our close friends and allies are no more effective than those of our enemies, but similarity breeds liking. People shave their heads and pierce their eyebrows not to fit in with the “dominant” culture but certainly to be more accepted by their peer group. Research on emotional contagion has shown that we even mimic the facial expressions, vocal expressions, postures, and instrumental behaviors of those we value in order to enhance our connection with them (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993). From the perspective of adaptive group behavior, conformity can be viewed as a “virtue,” because it provides a sense of trust that allows interdependence among group members (Campbell, 1975). Therefore, conforming to the behaviors and practices of important reference groups can make us more likable and desirable. Not surprisingly, normative social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) also pull the individual toward the group consensus. As we will see, conformity is stronger when responses are made in public and the group is large, interdependent, and attractive or valued. In addition, individual and cultural differences can enhance our susceptibility to conformity pressures.

Situational Factors Affecting Conformity for Social Approval The early conformity researchers all reported that participants adopted the group position for two reasons: either because they thought they were wrong or because it seemed easier to go along with the group than to disagree (Asch, 1956; Crutchfield, 1955; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). It is stressful to stand up against a majority opinion (Mugny, 1982; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983) because minority opinions can be met with laughter and derision (Asch, 1956; Schachtter, 1951). Several contextual factors appear to enhance the salience of social approval, however.

Enhancing the feeling that one belongs to a group rather than to an unconnected set of independent individuals should enhance the power of normative influence. Interdependence requires that all group members work with each other toward a common goal (Allen, 1965). Deutsch and Gerard (1955) tested the importance of perceived interdependence by offering a reward (a pair of Broadway tickets for each group member) for the groups who made the fewest errors. When interdependent, the level of conformity to the group was twice that of the noninterdependent condition. Similar results were found in studies using material rewards (Jones, Wells, & Torrey, 1958) and social rewards (Thibaut & Strickland, 1956).

The extent to which the responses are public also affects conformity. Unless a person knows that the group will learn everyone’s responses, there is little need to conform to obviously inaccurate responses. Many researchers have found less conformity on private responses than on public responses (for instance, Asch, 1956; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Insko et al., 1985). Insko et al. (1985) specifically manipulated the nature of the response (public versus private), as well as the size of the influence factor (one versus four others) and the ability to verify one’s responses at a later time. They presented a somewhat ambiguous task, asking participants to rate whether a blue-green slide was more similar to a blue or to a green slide. They found evidence consistent with normative influence: participants conformed more when making public judgments to a large group. On the other hand, they also found evidence of informational influence: participants also conformed more when they knew they could check the correct answers later. Once again, both concerns affected social influence.

The nature of the response affects not only response valence, but also the internalization of social influence. There is considerable evidence (see Nall, 1986) that people publicly conform to an inaccurate group judgment on objective tasks, but do not continue to conform when responses become private. Hence, normative social influence may not be lasting, especially on objective tasks. On the other hand, when the task is relatively ambiguous or difficult (as in the Sheriff [1936] study), the individual is more likely to accept the informational influence provided by the group and exhibit both public and private agreement.

The group’s attractiveness can affect its power to influence behavior, although the effects are not consistent. We like people who are similar to us (Byrne, 1971), and we sometimes take on the behaviors and affectations of people we want to emulate (Kelman’s 1958 concept of identification). Accordingly, conformity is greater when friends are in the group (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Lott & Lott, 1961; Thibaut & Strickland, 1956), when the person values the group or feels valued by the group (Dittes & Kelley, 1956; Kelley & Shapiro, 1954), and when individuals believe that group assignment has been based on shared characteristics (Gerard, 1954). More contemporary studies
continue to find greater conformity to liked or similar others. A study conducted in Japan compared the conformity levels of intact groups to that of groups of unacquainted students and found a significantly higher error rate for the intact groups (Williams & Sorgen, 1984). Similarly, psychology students who believed their performance was being evaluated by another psychology major conformed more than those who thought they were being evaluated by an ancient-history major (Abrams et al., 1990). Several studies have not found attraction effects in perceptual judgments, such as the autokinetic phenomenon (Downing, 1958) and the Asch experiment (Harper, 1961). Similar others may be more valuable sources for subjective judgments than they are for seemingly objective tasks (Gorenflo & Crano, 1989).

Individual Factors Affecting Conformity for Social Approval In addition to situational factors, individual characteristics, including several personality traits and gender, can affect susceptibility to conformity pressures. Crutchfield’s (1955) military leaders not only unwittingly participated in a conformity study; they also filled out several personality scales. He divided them into “independents” and “conformists” based on their conformity behavior and found that the independent men were higher in intellectual effectiveness, maturity, and ego strength, while being lower than conformists in rigidity, excessive self-control, and authoritarian attitudes. Conformity was also negatively correlated with tolerance, responsibility, and social participation. Although there are interesting anecdotal data, they still beg the question of whether particular types of people are more likely to conform than others.

Stein (1963) developed a Self-description Typology based upon Murray’s (1938) motivational aspects of personality. One type in particular, the conformity-oriented, is of most interest here. Those who report a high need for conformity are fearful of criticism by others, socially anxious, deferent to authority, and situationally focused as opposed to internally focused (Neulinger & Stein, 1971). They are also very high in need for structure (Roman et al., 1995), or an organized and clearly structured life. Although not tested specifically within a conformity paradigm, conformity-oriented types reported enjoying an unpleasant dissonance task more when forced to perform it than when given the choice (the opposite of the pattern found in typical dissonance studies) (Neulinger, 1965).

Another personality characteristic that specifically examines attention to one’s social surroundings is self-monitoring, although again it has not been tested specifically in a conformity setting (see Snyder, 1979). High self-monitors have been characterized as social chameleons: they are highly responsive to the demands of any situation in which they find themselves. The social approval of peers should therefore have a stronger impact on the behavior of high, as opposed to low, self-monitors. Supportive evidence indicates that high self-monitors are more likely than low self-monitors to express a false attitude (Zanna & Olson, 1982). Similarly, people who have a high need for affiliation are also more conforming (McClue & Teyvan, 1967). Finally, those who tend to seek social approval conform more to a group’s unanimous judgment than those low in a desire for social approval (Strickland & Crowne, 1962).

Considerable controversy has surrounded the existence of gender differences in conformity. The common wisdom is that women conform more readily than men do, and some early research reports supported that notion (Asch, 1956; Crutchfield, 1955, although finding contradictory evidence, too), as did several literature reviews (for example, Cooper, 1979; Nord, 1969). Eagly and Carli (1981) conducted a meta-analysis of all persuasion and conformity studies specifically to examine gender effects in susceptibility to social influence. Overall, the gender effect was small but reliable, indicating that women tend to be only slightly more susceptible to social influence than men (an effect equal in size to a correlation of .05 to .08). Among social influence studies in general, then, there appear to be no appreciable gender differences. One type of conformity study does, however, seem to foster more conformity in women than in men (Eagly, 1978): the type involving face-to-face, public interactions, such as the Asch paradigm. Although one explanation for this effect is that women are more concerned with maintaining group harmony than with accuracy (Eagly, 1978), a subsequent study found that men were particularly resistant to persuasion in the group setting, and women were equally conforming on public and private responses (Eagly, Wood, & Fishbaugh, 1981). In other words, men’s tendency to remain independent in the face of social pressure may have a stronger pull on the gender effect than women’s tendency to smooth and facilitate interactions, although the difference is negligible.

Cultural Factors Affecting Conformity for Social Approval Conformity appears to be a universal phenomenon, but the level of conformity varies by culture (Bond, 1988; Triandis et al., 1988). Milgram (1961) conducted a series of studies using a modified Asch paradigm in Norway and France. He found that the Norwegian students were significantly more likely to conform than the French students, as errors ranged from 50 to 75 percent in Norway and from 34 to 59 percent in France. Milgram speculated that the differences were culturally based, since the Norwegians have a reputation for being more unified and socially responsive, whereas the French have a long history of critical judgment, diverse opinions, and dissent. Whittaker and Meade (1967) repeated Asch’s conformity experiment in several countries and found a similar range of conformity: 31 percent in Lebanon, 32 in Hong Kong, 34 in Brazil, 31
among the Bantu of Zimbabwe (who have strong sanctions against nonconformity). A recent meta-analysis (Bond & Smith, 1996) of Asch-type studies across seventeen countries concluded that cultural values do affect conformity. In particular, people in countries that can be described as more collectivist in orientation (such as China) are more responsive to others’ influence than are people in more individualistic countries (such as the United States and Britain).

Collectivist cultures stress interdependence over independence: they are more concerned with attaining group goals and maintaining harmony than with individual success or achievement, and behavior is perceived to be more determined by cultural norms than by individual personality and attitudes (Triandis, 1994). In other words, in a collectivist culture, conformity does not have the same negative implications as in the more individualistic United States; rather, it is considered to be a sign of tolerance, self-control, and maturity (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Markus and Kitayama (1994) suggest that it may be time to expand our individualistic interpretation of conformity to embrace the more positive attributes of a collective nature. They note, “Despite the powerful cultural sanctions against allowing the collective to influence one’s thoughts and actions, most people are still much less self-reliant, self-contained, or self-sufficient than the ideology of individualism suggests they should be” (p. 575). Conformity to group standards may be an adaptive behavior, promoting sociocultural evolution (Campbell, 1975; Lumsden, 1988).

If so, the need to consider the collective may be even more important in light of evidence that conformity in Asch-type studies may be decreasing in the West (see Bond & Smith, 1996; Lalancette & Standing, 1990; Larsen, 1990). The Western focus on the self as paramount in social life is reflected in the importance of the third goal for conformity, managing one’s self-concept.

Some people conform to an erroneous group choice simply because being different from the group makes them feel bad about themselves and wordless (Asch, 1956). The acceptance by others that accompanies conformity can enhance our own sense of self-worth and self-esteem (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). On the other hand, people who value independence and self-reliance may feel equally uncomfortable upon finding out that they have conformed to an incorrect response (Asch, 1956), indicating that the implications of conformity for one’s self-concept need to be considered in terms of the task, the reference group, and one’s interdependence with other members of the group.

Summary: Conformity

Research into the nature of conformity arose out of Asch’s (1956) remarkable finding that people with normal vision would ignore their own eyes to agree publicly with an obviously inaccurate group judgment. Since that time, much additional evidence has demonstrated the seemingly irrational extent to which seemingly rational humans appear willing to go along with the crowd. We have argued that such behavior, as well as its less dramatic forms, is rendered more understandable when one considers three powerful personal goals that conformity can serve: a shift toward a group consensus can allow an individual (1) to believe that he or she now sees things more accurately, (2) to gain the approval and acceptance of desirable others, and (3) to avoid a self-conception as different, deviant, or intransigent. Although early researchers began with a focus on the dark side of conformity, we concur with the relatively more modern view that there are also social benefits of group cohesion and cooperation and that these beneficial social behaviors must be weighed against the negative impact of conformity.

The Goal of Managing Self-concept

One of the reasons for engaging in social comparison is to clarify who we are as individuals (Berkowitz, 1968; Festinger, 1954). When objective standards are not available to validate our self-concept, we look to similar others to do so. Although Festinger (1954) specifically described conformity to others’ opinions, the process can also apply to conformity more broadly. He proposed that pressures toward opinion uniformity occur in groups because we want others who are similar to us to share our opinions. When they do not share our opinions, we may be especially susceptible to conformity in order to avoid the social stigma of deviance. As noted earlier, deviation from the group position may be met with a variety of unpleasant consequences, including derision and rejection (Asch, 1956; Schachter, 1951).

COMPLIANCE

Compliance refers to a particular kind of response—acquiescence—to a particular kind of communication—a request. The request may be explicit, as in the direct solicitation of funds in a door-to-door campaign for charitable donations, or it may be implicit, as in a political advertisement that touts the qualities of a candidate without directly asking for a vote. But in all cases, the target recognizes that he or she is being urged to respond in a desired way. Systematic scientific study of the compliance process has been under way for well over half a century, beginning in earnest with the United States government’s public information and persuasion programs of World War II (e.g., Hovland, Lumsdale, & Sheffield, 1949; Lewin, 1947; Stouffer et al., 1949). As a consequence, the social science literature contains a substantial body of work on various
factors that cause one individual to comply with another’s request for action of some sort.

In reviewing that work, we concentrate primarily on a set of six psychological principles that appear to influence behavioral compliance decisions most powerfully. Ironically, we come to focus on these six principles not because of their prevalence in the investigations of social scientists but because of their prevalence in the practices of commercial compliance professionals—the rationale for which is provided in the following section. Briefly, the principles involve pressures to comply because of tendencies to: (1) reciprocate a gift, favor, or service, (2) be consistent with prior commitments, (3) follow the lead of similar others, (4) accommodate the requests of those we know and like, (5) conform to the directives of legitimate authority, and (6) seize opportunities that are scarce or dwindling in availability. We discuss each of these tendencies in terms of its compatibility with one or another of the three major influence-relevant goals highlighted in this chapter: to enhance effectiveness, to build and maintain social relationships, and to manage self-concept.

**Locating Powerful Phenomena**

Within academic social psychology, research into the behavioral compliance process has emphasized two questions: Which principles and techniques reliably affect compliance? and How do these principles and techniques work to affect compliance as they do? The first of these questions is concerned with the identification of real (i.e., reliable) effects, the second with their theoretical or conceptual mediation. Almost without exception, the vehicle that has been employed to answer these two questions has been the controlled experiment. This is understandable, since controlled experimentation provides an excellent context for addressing such issues (Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998, in this *Handbook*).

A different approach is necessary when one’s concern with the compliance process is more than purely academic, as is the case for most of us who find ourselves either interested investigators or interested observers of the interpersonal influence interactions of daily life. We want to know more than whether a particular influence exists and what causes it. We also want to know how powerful it is in the course of naturally occurring behavior, so that we can better decide whether the effect is worthy of our attention and study. In referring to the power of an effect on naturally occurring compliance, we mean its ability to change compliance decisions meaningfully over a wide range of everyday situations and circumstances.

Regrettably, when the question of primary interest includes a determination of the power of possible influences on natural compliance behavior, the controlled experiment becomes less suited to the job. The high levels of experimental rigor and precision that allow us to know that an effect is genuine and theoretically interpretable simultaneously decrease our ability to assess the potency of that effect. That is, because the best-designed experiments (1) eliminate or control away all sources of influence except the one under study and (2) possess highly sensitive measurements techniques, they may register weak effects that may be so small as never to make a difference when other (extraneous) factors are allowed to vary naturally, as they typically do in the social environment. What’s more, such ecologically trivial effects can be replicated repeatedly in the antiseptic environment of the controlled experiment, giving the mistaken impression of power, when in reality, all that has been demonstrated is the reliability of the effects.

Thus, rigorous experimentation is not best employed as the primary device for deciding which compliance-related influences are powerful enough to be submitted to rigorous experimentation for further study. Some other starting point should be found to identify the most potent influences on the compliance process. Otherwise, valuable time could well be spent seeking to investigate and to apply effects that are merely epiphenomena of the controlled experimental setting. That said, we should not be misunderstood as believing that a controlled experimental approach is inappropriate to the study of compliance action, as that is hardly the case. We mean to suggest only that this approach is more properly suited to answering questions about the reliability and conceptual mediation of effects that have been identified by other means to be worthy of such inquiry.

**The Systematic Observation of Commercial Compliance Professionals**

A crucial question thus is, How does one determine which are the most powerful compliance principles and tactics? One method is the systematic observation of the behaviors of commercial compliance professionals.

Who are the commercial compliance professionals and why should their actions be especially informative as to the identification of powerful influences on everyday compliance decisions? They can be defined as those individuals whose business or financial well-being depends on their ability to induce compliance (e.g., salespeople, fund-raisers, advertisers, political lobbyists, cult recruiters, negotiators, con artists). With this definition in place, one can begin to recognize why the regular and widespread practices of these professionals would be noteworthy indicators of the powerful influences on the compliance process: because the livelihoods of commercial compliance professionals depend on the effectiveness of their procedures, those professionals who use procedures that work well to elicit compliance responses will survive and flourish. Further, they will pass these successful procedures on to succeeding generations (trainees). However, those practitioners who use unsuccessful compliance procedures either
will drop them or will quickly go out of business; in either case, the procedures themselves will not be passed on to newer generations.

The upshot of this process is that, over time and over the range of naturally occurring compliance contexts, the strongest and most adaptable procedures for generating compliance will rise, persist, and accumulate. Further, these procedures should point a careful observer toward the major principles that people use to decide when to comply. Note, however, that this analysis applies primarily to commercial compliance professionals, whose economic welfare is highly related to the success of the compliance practices they employ. That is, we should not expect a body of adaptive procedures to develop and proliferate to the same degree among noncommercial compliance organizations, in which the "invisible hand of the market" does not sweep away inefficient practices over time. For example, patient compliance with certain medical regimens (medication, diet, exercise) is notoriously poor (Colon et al., 1991; Eacker, Kirscht, & Becker, 1984). One reason may be that, unlike the commercial compliance situation wherein a noncompliant target person departs from and impoverishes the system, in a medical care system, a noncompliant person stays and enriches it. Thus, in seeking evidence as to the most regular and potent influences on the compliance process, we would be well advised to pay principal attention to the compliance repertoires of long-standing commercial compliance professions.

Employing this logic and the methodology of participant observation, Cialdini (1993) engaged in an extended investigation of the influence techniques that are most frequently taught to and used by marketers, fund-raisers, salespeople, and the like. What emerged was a list of six principles on which compliance professionals appeared to base most of their psychological influence attempts: reciprocity, consistency, social validation, friendship or liking, authority, and scarcity. Subsequent research has documented the ability of these principles to mediate influence in such diverse, naturally occurring settings as home Tupperware parties (Frenzen & Davis, 1990), telephone charity solicitations (Howard, 1995), bill collector and debtor interactions (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991), corporate boardroom negotiations (Bellew, O'Reilly, & Wade, in press; Main, O'Reilly, & Wade, 1995), and retail clothing store sales pitches (Cod, Seiter, & Montague-Miller, 1995). For example, the Cod, Seiter, and Montague-Miller (1995) study found that each of these principles, when incorporated into the sales techniques of department store clerks, produced a significant increase in retail clothing purchases.

The remainder of this chapter offers an account of the origins and workings of these principles, as well as of the social scientific theory and evidence regarding how each principle functions to motivate compliance. Our discussion groups the principles in terms of the goals that compliance is likely to serve for the recipient of a request.

The Goal of Effective Action

A strong motivation for most of us is to choose well so as to do well. The basic tendency toward material self-interest inclines people to want to expend or pay the least to get the most. Compliance professionals of every stripe frequently seek to tap that tendency by offering "a good deal." The problem for the recipient of this kind of approach, of course, lies in recognizing when the offered deal is a good one. When can one trust that a decision in the direction of a particular proposal is likely to be wise and effective? Several principles of influence derive much of their force from their informativeness in answering this question. We will consider them in turn.

Authority Legitimately constituted authorities are extremely influential persons (e.g., Aronson, Turner, & Carlsmith, 1963; Blass, 1991; Milgram, 1974). Whether they have acquired their positions through knowledge, talent, or fortune, their positions bespeak superior information and power. We have all had experience with such figures all our lives. Early on, these people (e.g., parents, teachers) knew more than us, and we found that taking their advice proved beneficial—partly because of their greater wisdom and partly because they controlled our rewards and punishments. As we became adults, the authority figures changed to employers, judges, experts, and the like, but the benefits associated with doing as they say did not change. For most people, then, conforming to the dictates of authority figures produces genuine practical advantages. Consequently, it makes sense to comply with the wishes of properly constituted authorities. It makes so much sense, in fact, that people often do so even when it makes no sense at all.

Perhaps nowhere is this last point driven home more dramatically than in the life-and-death consequences of a phenomenon that airline industry officials have labeled Captainitis (Foushee, 1984). Accident investigators from the Federal Aviation Administration have noted that in many accidents, an obvious error by a flight captain was not corrected by the other crew members and resulted in a crash. It seems that, despite the clear and strong personal importance of the decision, the crew members were using an authority heuristic in failing to attend or respond to the captain's disastrous mistake (Harper, Kidem, & Cullen, 1971). Indeed, evidence suggests that when such a heuristic is likely to come into play—because the captain has an authoritarian leadership style—crews are highly susceptible to errors (Kanki & Foushee, 1990).

The most dramatic research evidence for the power of legitimate authority comes from the famous Milgram experiment, in which 65 percent of the subjects were willing to deliver continued, intense, and dangerous levels of electric shock to an innocent other subject simply because an authority figure—in this case a scientist—directed them to do so. Although nearly everyone who has taken a psychol-
ogy course has learned about this experiment, Milgram (1974) conducted a series of variations on his basic procedure that are less well known but equally compelling in demonstrating the powerful role that authority played in causing subjects to behave so cruelly. In one variation, Milgram had the scientist and the victim switch scripts; that is, the scientist told the subject to stop delivering shock to the victim, while the victim insisted bravely that the subject continue for the good of the experiment. The results could not have been clearer: not a single subject gave even one additional shock when the demand came from a nonauthority. Additional work has confirmed the basic finding that when nonauthorities give the commands in the Milgram paradigm, obedience drops significantly (see Blass, 1991, for a review). Finally, just as would be expected if such obedience were based on a decision to defer to authority, individuals possessing authoritarian beliefs are especially likely to comply with authority directives, in the Milgram setting (Elms & Milgram, 1966) and in other settings (Ditto et al., 1995; Miller, 1975).

Authorities may be seen as falling into two categories: those specific to the particular situation, and more general authorities (Jordan, 1993). Compliance practitioners employ techniques that seek to benefit from the power invested in authority figures of both types. In the case of authority relevant to a specific situation, we can note how often advertisers inform their audiences of the level of expertise of product manufacturers (e.g., “Fashionable Men’s Clothing since 1841.” “Babies are our business, our only business.”). At times, the expertise associated with a product has been more symbolic than substantive—for instance, when an actor in a television commercial wears a physician’s white coat to recommend a product. In one famous Sanka commercial, the actor involved, Robert Young, did not need a white coat, his prior identity as TV doctor Marcus Welby, M.D., provided the medical connection.

It is instructive that the mere symbols of a physician’s expertise and authority are enough to trip the mechanism that governs authority influence. One of the most prominent of these symbols, the bare title “Doctor,” has been shown to be devastatingly effective as a compliance device among trained hospital personnel. In one study, a group of physicians and nurses conducted an experiment that documented the dangerous degree of blind obedience that hospital nurses accorded to an individual whom they had never met, but who had claimed in a phone call to be a doctor (Holling et al., 1966). Ninety-five percent of those nurses were willing to administer an unsafe level of a drug merely because the caller requested it. Subsequent research has found that, varying different aspects of the situation (e.g., the nature of the request or the nurses’ familiarity with the drug) can affect the level of obedience, but the amount of compliance remains dangerously high (Krackow & Blass, 1995; Rank & Jacobson, 1977).

In the case of influence that generalizes outside of relevant expertise, the impact of authority (real and symbolic) appears equally impressive. For instance, researchers have found that, when wearing a security guard’s uniform, a requester could produce more compliance with requests (e.g., to pick up a paper bag on the street, to stand on the other side of a bus stop sign) that were irrelevant to a security guard’s domain of authority (Bickman, 1974; Bushman, 1988). Less blatant in its connotation than a uniform, but nonetheless effective, is another kind of attire that has traditionally bespoken authority status in our culture: the well-tailored business suit. This attire, too, can mediate influence. Take as evidence the results of a study by Leffkowitz, Blake, and Mouton (1955), who found that three and a half times as many people were willing to follow into traffic a jaywalker who was wearing a suit and tie as opposed to a work shirt and trousers (but see Mullin, Cooper, & Driskell, 1990).

Con artists frequently make use of the influence inherent in authority attire. For example, a gambit called the bank examiner scheme depends heavily on the automatic deference that most people afford authority figures, or those merely dressed as such. Using the two uniforms of authority we have already mentioned, a business suit and guard’s outfit, the con begins when a man dressed in a conservative three-piece business suit appears at the home of a likely victim and identifies himself as an official of the victim’s bank. The victim is told of suspected irregularities in the transactions handled by a particular teller and is asked to help trap the teller by drawing out all of his or her savings at the teller’s window. In this way, the examination can “catch the teller red-handed” in any wrongdoing. After cooperating, the victim is to give the money to a uniformed bank guard waiting outside, who will then return it to the proper account. Often, the appearance of the “bank examiner” and uniformed “guard” are so impressive that the victim never thinks to check on their authenticity and proceeds with the requested action, never to see the money or those two individuals again.

Social Validation People frequently use the actions of others, particularly similar others, as a standard of comparison against which to evaluate the correctness of their own actions. Thus, individuals commonly decide on appropriate behaviors for themselves in a given situation by employing information as to how certain similar others have behaved or are behaving there (e.g., Darley & Latané, 1970; Festinger, 1954; Schachter & Singer, 1962). This simple principle of behavior accounts for an amazingly varied array of human responses. For instance, research has shown that New Yorkers use it in deciding whether to return a lost wallet (Hornstein, Fisch, & Holmes, 1968), that children with a fear of dogs use it in deciding whether to risk approaching a dog (Bandura & Menlove, 1968), that amusement park visitors use it to decide whether to litter in a public place (Gialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990), that audi-
ence members use it in deciding whether a joke is funny (Cupchik & Leventhal, 1974), that pedestrians use it in deciding whether to stop and stare at an empty spot in the sky (Milgram, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969), and, on the alarming side, that troubled individuals use it in deciding whether to commit suicide (Garland & Zigler, 1993; Phillips & Cartensen, 1988).

Much of this evidence can be understood in terms of Festinger’s (1954) Social Comparison Theory, which states that (1) people have a constant drive to evaluate themselves (i.e., the appropriateness of their abilities, beliefs, feelings, and behaviors); (2) if available, people prefer to use objective cues to make these evaluations; (3) if objective evidence is not available, people rely on social comparison evidence instead; and (4) when seeking social comparison evidence for these self-evaluations, people look to similar others as the preferred basis for comparison.

When the goal is to evaluate the correctness of an opinion or action, research has generally supported Festinger’s theory. For example, social comparison is most likely to occur in situations that are objectively unclear (Tesser, Campbell, & Mickler, 1983) and is most likely to be directed at similar others (Goethals & Darley, 1977; Miller, 1984). Thus, when people are unsure, they are most likely to look to and accept the beliefs and behaviors of similar others as valid indicators of what they themselves should believe and do. A bit of reflection suggests the reason for this behavior: When unsure of how to decide, we are ill-advised to look inside ourselves—where uncertainty reigns—for answers; instead we must look outside. Where no objective information exists, we tend to look at others. But because the purpose is to decide how we should act, we are inclined to examine the actions of a specific kind of others—those who are or who seem most like us. Thus, people are more likely to comply with a request when the request is accompanied by information that similar others have already done so (Melamed et al., 1978; Murray et al., 1984).

Our tendency to assume that an action is more correct if similar others are doing it is exploited in a variety of settings. New-car dealers target the next-door neighbors of recent customers. Bartenders often “salt” their tip jars with a few dollar bills at the beginning of the evening to simulate tips left by prior customers and thereby give the impression that tipping with folding money is proper barroom behavior. Church ushers sometimes prime collection baskets for the same reason and with the same positive effect on proceeds. Evangelical preachers are known to seed their audiences with “ringers,” who are rehearsed to come forward at a specified time to give witness and donations. For example, an Arizona State University research team that infiltrated the Billy Graham organization reported on such advance preparations prior to one of his Crusade visits. “By the time Graham arrives in town and makes his altar call, an army of 6,000 await with instructions on when to come forth at varying intervals to create the impression of spontaneous mass outpouring” (Altheide & Johnson, 1977).

That an “army” of others gave evidence of appropriate conduct in this example is instructive. In addition to the similarity of compliant models, their number is also diagnostic of a correct choice; we are more swayed by the actions of multiple rather than single models (Bandura & Menlove, 1968; Fehrenbach, Miller, & Thelen, 1979; Milgram, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969). Thus, advertisers love to inform us when a product is the “fastest growing” or “largest selling,” because they don’t have to convince us directly that the product is good; they need only say that many others think so. The producers of charity telethons devote inordinate amounts of time to the incessant listing of viewers who have already pledged contributions. The message being communicated to the holdouts is clear: “Look at all the people who have decided to give; it must be the correct thing to do.”

One tactic that compliance professionals use to engage the principle of social validation has been put to scientific test. Called the list technique, it involves asking for a request only after the target person has been shown a list of similar others who have already complied. Reingen (1982) conducted several experiments in which college students or home owners were asked to donate money or blood to a charitable cause. Individuals who were initially shown a list of similar others who had already complied were significantly more likely to comply themselves than were those who had not been shown such a list. Furthermore, the longer the list, the greater was the effect.

Scarcity Opportunities seem more valuable to us when they are less available (Lynn, 1991). Interestingly, this is often true even when the opportunity holds little attraction for us on its own merits. Take as evidence the experience of Florida State University students who, like most undergraduates, rated themselves dissatisfied with the quality of their cafeteria’s food. Nine days later they changed their minds, rating that food significantly better than they had before, even though the food service had not actually improved since the first rating. Instead, earlier on the day of the second rating, students had learned that, because of a fire, they could not eat at the cafeteria for two weeks (West, 1975).

Scarcity is a powerful motivator for two main reasons. First, because we know that things that are difficult to possess are typically better than those that are easy to possess (Lynn, 1992), we can often use an item’s availability to help us quickly and correctly decide on its quality. As even Aristotle conceded, “What is rare is a greater good than what is plentiful.” Thus, one reason for the potency of scarcity is that, by assessing it, we can obtain a heuristic indication of an item’s value (Cialdini, 1993; Ditto & Jennett, 1989).
Second, scarcity derives motivational power from a unique source: as the things we can have become less available, we lose the freedom to choose them and the attendant ability to act most effectively. A desire to preserve our free choice is the centerpiece of Psychological Reactance Theory (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981), developed to explain the human response to diminishing personal control. According to the theory, whenever our freedoms are limited or threatened, the need to retain them makes us want them (as well as the goods and services associated with them) significantly more than previously. So, when increasing scarcity—or anything else—interferes with our prior access to a particular item, we react against the interference by wanting and trying to possess the item more than before. Heilman (1976) showed how reactance can be made to lead to compliance: supermarket shoppers were most likely to agree to sign a petition favoring federal price controls when the requester incited reactance by informing them that a federal official had opposed the distribution of the petition.

One naturally occurring example of the consequences of increased scarcity can be seen in the outcome of a decision by county officials in Miami to ban the use and possession of phosphate detergents. Spurred by the tendency to want what they could no longer have, the majority of Miami consumers came to see phosphate cleaners as better products than before. Compared to Tampa residents, who were not affected by the Miami ordinance, the citizens of Miami rated phosphate detergents as gentler, more effective in cold water, better whiteners and fresheners, more powerful on stains, and so on. After passage of the law, they had even come to believe that phosphate detergents poured easier than did the Tampa consumers (Mazis, 1975).

This sort of response is typical of individuals who have lost an established freedom, and it is crucial to an understanding of how psychological reactance and scarcity work on us. When our freedom to have something is limited, the item becomes less available and we experience an increased desire for it. However, we rarely recognize that psychological reactance has caused us to want the item more; all we know is that we want it. In the need to make sense of our desire for the item, we begin to assign it positive qualities to justify the desire. After all, it is natural to suppose that we are drawn to something because of its merit. In the case of the Miami antiphosphate law—and in other instances of newly restricted availability—that is a faulty supposition. Phosphate detergents clean, whiten, and pour better after they are banned than before. We just assume they do because we find that we desire them more.

Other research has suggested that like commodities, information is more desirable—and more influential—when access to it is limited (Brock, 1968; Brock & Bannon, 1992). One test of Brock's thinking found good support in a business setting. Wholesale beef buyers who were told of an impending imported-beef shortage purchased significantly more beef when they were informed that the shortage information came from certain "exclusive" contacts that the importer had (Kushinsky, 1982). Apparently, the fact that the scarcity news was itself scarce made it more valued and persuasive. Additional evidence—from the literature on censorship—suggests that restricting information can empower that information in unintended ways. Individuals typically respond to censorship by wanting to receive the banned information to a greater extent and by perceiving it more favorably than they did before the ban (e.g., Worshel, 1992; Worshel & Arnold, 1973). Especially interesting is the finding that people will come to believe in banned information more, even though they have not received it (Worshel, Arnold, & Baker, 1975). Even self-imposed bans on information can have powerful effects. Wegner, Lane, and Dimitri (1994) demonstrated that clandestine romantic relationships are more memorable than the overt variety—and generate more attraction as well.

With scarcity operating forcefully on assigned worth, it should not be surprising that compliance professionals have a variety of techniques designed to convert this power to compliance. Probably the most frequently used such technique is the "limited-number" tactic, in which the customer is informed that membership opportunities, products, or services exist in a limited supply that cannot be guaranteed to last long. Related to the limited-number tactic is the "deadline" technique, in which an official time limit is placed on the customer's opportunity to get what is being offered. Newspaper ads abound with admonitions to the customer regarding the folly of delay: "Last three days." "Limited time offer." "One week only sale." The purest form of a decision deadline—"right now"—occurs in a variant of the deadline technique in which customers are told that, unless they make an immediate purchase decision, they will have to buy the item at a higher price or they will not be able to purchase it at all. Cialdini (1993) reported use of this tactic in numerous compliance settings: A large child photography company urges parents to buy as many photos and copies as they can afford because "stocking limitations force us to burn the unsold pictures of your children within twenty-four hours." A prospective health club member or automobile buyer might learn that the deal offered by the salesperson is good for only that one time; should the customer leave the premises, the deal is off. One home vacuum cleaner sales company instructs trainees to claim to prospects that "I have so many other people to see that I have the time to visit a family only once. It's company policy that even if you decide later that you want this machine, I can't come back and sell it to you." For anyone who thinks about it carefully, this is nonsense; the company and its representatives are in the business of making sales, and any customer who called for another visit would be accommodated gladly. The real purpose of the can't-come-back-
The Goal of Building and Maintaining Social Relationships

Compliance may be used tactically to forge new interpersonal connections or to protect, solidify, and strengthen existing ones. After all, granting a request is typically rewarding to the requester, whereas denying the request is punishing; and much research has documented the association between the rewardiness of a relationship and its attractiveness (Burgess & Huston, 1979; Kelley, 1979; Rustad, 1980). Consequently, if the goal of building and maintaining social relationships influences compliance decisions, we ought to see more compliance with the requests of likable individuals, that is, those with whom a relationship would be more enjoyable; and, as is documented in the following section on liking, we do. Moreover, we should expect to see more compliance when that compliance is likely to lead to and bolster desirable social ties; and once again we do, as is documented in the subsequent section on reciprocation.

Liking People are more favorably inclined toward the needs of those they know and like. This fact is definitively shown by the remarkable success of the Tupperware Corporation and their “home party” demonstration concept (Taylor, 1978). The demonstration party for Tupperware products is hosted by an individual, usually a woman, who invites to her home an array of friends, neighbors, and relatives, all of whom know that their hostess receives a percentage of the profits from every piece sold by the Tupperware representative, who is also there. In this way, the Tupperware Corporation arranges for its customers to buy from and for a friend rather than from an unknown salesperson. One study (Frezza & Davis, 1990) found that, in a home party setting, strength of social ties between the invitee and hostess accounted for twice as much variance (67 percent) in purchase likelihood as did preference for the product (33 percent). So favorable has been the effect on proceeds ($2.5 million in sales per day) that the Tupperware Corporation has wholly abandoned its early retail outlets, and, according to company literature, a Tupperware party begins somewhere in the world every 2.7 seconds.

Most influence agents, however, attempt to engage the liking principle in a different way: Before making a request, they get their targets to like them. How do they do it? The tactics that practitioners use to generate liking cluster around certain factors that also have been shown by controlled research to increase liking.

Physical Attractiveness Although it is generally acknowledged that good-looking people have an advantage in social interaction, research findings indicate that we may have sorely underestimated the size and reach of that advantage. A positive reaction to good physical appearance appears to generalize to such favorable trait perceptions as talent, kindness, honesty, and intelligence (see Eagly et al., 1991, for a review). As a consequence, attractive individuals are more persuasive both in terms of changing attitudes (Chaiken, 1979) and in getting what they request (Benson, Karabenick, & Lerner, 1976).

Voter perceptions and behaviors are influenced to an unsettling degree by candidate attractiveness (see Budescu and DePaula, 1994, for a review). For instance, a study of the 1974 Canadian federal elections found that attractive candidates received more than two and a half times the votes of unattractive ones (Efran & Patterson, 1976). Equally impressive results appear in the judicial system (see reviews by Castellow, Wuensch, and Moore, 1990, and Downs and Lyons, 1991). In a Pennsylvania study, researchers rated the physical attractiveness of seventy-four separate male defendants at the start of their criminal trial. When, much later, the researchers checked the results of these cases via court records, they found that the better-looking men received significantly lighter sentences. In fact, the attractive defendants were twice as likely to avoid incarceration as the unattractive defendants (Stewart, 1980). In a fund-raising context, one study found that attractive solicitors for the American Heart Association generated nearly twice as much compliance (42 versus 23 per-
cent) than did unattractive solicitors (Reingen & Kernan, 1993). Similar results have been obtained in business settings, where physical attractiveness has a favorable impact on sales effectiveness (Kiviszita, Honkanen, & Sundvik, 1994; Reingen & Kernan, 1993) and on income levels across a wide range of occupations (Hamermesh & Biddle, 1994). In the light of such powerful effects, it is not surprising that extremely attractive models are employed to promote products and services, that sales trainers frequently include appearance and grooming tips in their presentations, and that men are commonly handsome and women commonly pretty.

**Similarity** We like people who are similar to us (Byrne, 1971; Carl, Ganley, & Pierce-Otay, 1991; Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, & Holworth, 1993), and we grant them favorable treatment in charitable (Devidio, 1984), negotiation (Kramer, Pommerehne, & Newton, 1993), and legal settings (Amato, 1979; Towsen & Zanna, 1983). This fact seems to hold true whether the similarity occurs in the area of opinions, personality traits, background, or lifestyle. Consequently, those who wish to be liked in order to increase our compliance can accomplish that purpose by appearing similar to us in any of a wide variety of ways. For this reason, it would be wise to be careful about salespeople who only seem to be just like us. Many sales training programs now urge trainees to “mirror and match” the customer’s body posture, mood, and verbal style, because similarities along each of these dimensions have been shown to lead to positive results (LaFrance, 1985; Locke & Horowitz, 1990; Woodside & Davenport, 1974).

Similarity in dress provides another example. Several studies have demonstrated that we are more likely to help those who dress like us. In one study conducted in the early 1970s, when young people tended to dress either in “hippie” or in “straight” fashion, experimenters dressed hippie or straight attire and asked college students on a campus for a dime to make a phone call. When the experimenter was dressed in the same way as the student, the request was granted in more than two-thirds of the instances; but when the student and requester were dissimilarly dressed, a dime was provided less than half of the time (Emminger, Deaux, & Willits, 1971). Another experiment shows how automatic our positive response to similar others can be. Marchers in a political demonstration were found not only to be more likely to sign the petition of a similarly dressed requester, but to do so without bothering to read it first (Suedfeld, Bochner, & Matas, 1971).

**Compliments** Praise and other forms of positive estimation also stimulate liking (e.g., Byrne & Rhamney, 1965). The simple information that someone fancies us can be a highly effective device for producing return liking and willing compliance (Berscheid & Walster, 1978). Although there are limits to our gullibility—especially when we can be sure that the flatterer’s intent is manipulative (Jones & Wortman, 1973)—we tend as a rule to believe praise and to like those who provide it. Evidence for the power of praise on liking comes from a study (Drachman, deCarufel, & Insko, 1978) in which men received personal comments from someone who needed a favor from them. Some of the men got only positive comments, some only negative comments, and some a mixture of good and bad. There were three interesting findings. First, the evaluator who offered only praise was liked the best. Second, the first finding held even if the men fully realized that the flatterer stood to gain from their liking of them. Finally, unlike the other types of comments, pure praise did not have to be accurate to work. Compliments produced just as much liking for the flatterer when they were untrue as when they were true. For these reasons, direct salespeople are educated in the art of praise. A potential customer’s home, clothes, car, taste, and so on, are all frequent targets for compliments (Cialdini, 1993).

**Cooperation** Cooperation is another factor that has been shown to enhance positive feelings and behavior (Aronson, Bridgeman, & Geffner, 1978; Bettencourt et al., 1992; Cook, 1990). Those who cooperate toward the achievement of a common goal are more favorable and helpful to each other as a consequence. That is why compliance professionals often strive to be perceived as cooperating partners with a target person (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). Automobile sales managers frequently set themselves as “villains” so that the salesperson can “do battle” in the customer’s behalf. The cooperative, pulling-together kind of relationship that is consequently produced between the salesperson and customer naturally leads to a desirable form of liking that promotes sales.

**Reciprocity** One of the most powerful norms in all human cultures is that of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). This norm obligates individuals to return the form of behavior that they have received from another. Not only does the norm apply to all cultures; it applies to all behavior within cultures. For instance, we report liking those who report liking us (Byrne & Rhamney, 1965; Condon & Crano, 1988); we cooperate with cooperators and compete against competitors (Braver, 1973; Rosenbaum, 1980); we self-disclose to those who have self-disclosed to us (Cunningham, Strawberg, & Haan, 1986; Melekhko & Aiken, 1993); we yield to the persuasive appeals of those who have previously yielded to one of our persuasive appeals (Cialdini, Green, & Rusch, 1992); we try to harm those who have tried to harm us (Dengerink, Schmeidler, &
Covey, 1978); and in negotiations, we make concessions to those who have offered concessions to us (Axelrod, 1984).

Under this general rule, people feel obligated to provide gifts, favors, services, and aid to those who have given them such things first (DePaulo, Brittingham, & Kaiser, 1983; Eisenberger, Cotterell, & Marvel, 1987; Tesser, Gatewood, & Driver, 1968), sometimes even returning larger favors than those they have received (Regan, 1971). Anyone who violates the rules by failing to reciprocate the prosocial actions of another risks damaging the relationship with that other (Cotterell, Eisenberger, & Speicher, 1992; Meleshko & Alden, 1993), as well as his or her larger interpersonal reputation; terms such as “moocher,” “taker,” and “ingrate” are frequently applied to those who take without giving in return. Several sales and fund-raising tactics use this factor to advantage. The compliance professional initially gives something to the target person, thereby causing the target to be more likely to give something in return. Often, this “something in return” is the target person’s compliance with a substantial request (Howard, 1995).

The unsolicited gift, accompanied by a request for a donation, is a common technique that employs the norm for reciprocity. One familiar example is the Hare Krishna solicitor who gives the unwary charity a book or a flower and then asks for a donation. Other organizations send free gifts through the mail; legitimate and less-than-legitimate missionary and disabled-veterans organizations often employ this highly effective device. These groups count on the fact that most people will not go to the trouble of returning the gift and will feel uncomfortable about keeping it without reciprocating in some way. For instance, the Disabled American Veterans organization reports that its simple mail appeal for donations produces a response rate of about 18 percent. But when the mailing also includes an unsolicited gift (gummed, individualized address labels), the success rate nearly doubles, to 35 percent (Smolowe, 1990).

The socialized sense of discomfort that attends an unpaid debt explains not only why people often agree to perform a return favor that is larger than the one they received, but also why people frequently refrain from asking for a needed favor if they will not go to the trouble of repaying it (DePaulo, Nadler, & Fisher, 1983; Greenberg & Shapiro, 1971; Riley & Eckenrode, 1986). The saddle of unmet social debt weighs heavily, and we go to considerable lengths to remove or avoid it. This may explain why individuals performing a computer task were more willing to seek help when the source of the aid was the computer rather than another person (Karabenick & Knapp, 1988).

The features of the rule for reciprocation account nicely for the twin outcomes of a study by Rand Corporation researchers Berry and Kanouse (1987). They found that, by paying physicians first, they could increase the likelihood that the doctors would complete and return a long questionnaire they received in the mail. If a check for $20 accompanied the questionnaire, 78 of the physicians filled out the survey and sent it back as requested. But if the doctors learned that the $20 check was to be sent to them after they returned a completed questionnaire, only 66 percent did so. By giving the check the character of a noncontingent gift rather than of a reward for compliance, the researchers enhanced their success substantially. The second reciprocation-related finding concerned only the physicians who got the check up front. As indicated, most of the doctors complied with the questionnaire request, but some did not. Although nearly all (95 percent) of the doctors who had complied cashed their checks, only 26 percent of those who did not comply did so. If they were not in a position to reciprocate the $20 gift, they were not of a mind to accept it, making the accompanying-gift technique a highly cost-effective one for the researchers.

In general, survey researchers have found that including monetary incentives along with a mail survey questionnaire produces significant increases in compliance. One meta-analysis determined that such incentives generated an average 65 percent increase in return rate (nineteen percentage points) over mail survey requests that included no incentives; when comparably sized incentives were offered contingent upon completion of the survey, however, compliance was not enhanced (Church, 1993). In fact, a study by James and Bolstein (1992) found that a check for $5 that accompanied a single mailed survey request produced significantly more compliance than an offer of $50 to be paid after survey completion (52 versus 23 percent), which produced no more compliance than a no-incentive control condition (21 percent). Furthermore, as in the Berry and Kanouse (1987) study, the great majority of those who received the $5 check but did not complete the accompanying survey as requested also did not cash the check.

Reciprocal Concessions An extension of the general norm of reciprocation is that of reciprocation of concessions. A reciprocal concessions procedure (or door-in-the-face technique) for inducing compliance has been documented repeatedly (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1975; Harari, Mohr, & Hoyer, 1980; Mowen & Cialdini, 1980; Reeves et al., 1991; Wang, Brownstein, & Katzov, 1989). A requester uses this procedure by beginning with an extreme request that is nearly always rejected and then retreating to a more moderate favor—the one the requester had in mind from the outset. In doing so, the requester hopes that the retreat from extreme to moderate request will spur the target person to make a reciprocal concession—moving from initial rejection of the larger favor to acceptance of the smaller one.

This reciprocal concessions strategy has been success-
fully used in fund-raising contexts in which, after refusing a larger request for donations, people become substantially more likely than before to give the average contribution (Reingen, 1978). Cialdini and Ascani (1976) used this technique in soliciting blood donors. They first requested a person’s involvement in a long-term donor program. When that request was refused, the solicitor made a smaller request for a one-time donation. This pattern of a large request (which is refused) followed by a smaller request significantly increased compliance with the smaller request, as compared to a control condition of people who were asked to perform only the smaller, one-time favor (50 percent versus 32 percent compliance rate). Of special interest to university students and faculty is evidence that the door-in-the-face technique can greatly increase a professor’s willingness to spend time helping a student (Harari, Mohr, & Hosey, 1980). In that study, only 59 percent of faculty members were willing to spend “fifteen to twenty minutes” to meet with a student on an issue of interest to the student—when that was the only request the student made. However, significantly more faculty members (78 percent) were willing to agree to the same request if they had first refused the student’s request to spend “two hours a week for the rest of the semester” meeting with the student.

Tellingly, procedures that undermine the target person’s perception that the second request of the sequence represents a legitimately offered concession from the first have eliminated the tactic’s effectiveness. For example, extending the length of time between the first and second request (Cann, Sherman, & Elkes, 1975), changing requesters in midsequence (Snyder & Cunningham, 1975), beginning with an unreasonably large first request (Schwarz, Raz, & Zvibel, 1979), and using a requester who has low credibility (Patch, 1986; Williams & Williams, 1989) have all been shown to neutralize the technique. Each of these neutralizing circumstances can be seen to reduce the extent to which an obligation to reciprocate a concession would be expected to guide behavior. What emerges, then, is evidence that the effectiveness of the technique is mediated by the operation of the norm of reciprocity.

Related to the door-in-the-face technique, but somewhat different, is the that’s-not-all technique investigated by Burger (1986) and frequently used by sales operators. An important procedural difference between the two techniques is that, in the that’s-not-all tactic, the target person does not turn down the first offer before a better second offer is provided. After making the first offer but before the target can respond, the requester better the deal with an additional item or a price reduction. Burger (1986) found this approach to be useful in selling more bakery goods during a campus bake sale. One reason that this technique works appears to be the target person’s desire to reciprocate the receipt of the better deal.

The Goal of Managing Self-concept

In addition to helping us to take effective action or to build and maintain social relationships, compliance may be used for the purpose of managing self-concept on desired dimensions. Any meaningful behavior can affect how we think of ourselves (Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985), and compliant behavior is no exception (Cialdini et al., 1987). Because compliance can affect how we think of ourselves, we can use it both to enhance and to verify our self-definitions (Swann, 1990). For example, someone in acute need of an ego boost might be especially likely to acquiesce to a charity request so as to bolster self-concept (as an altruistic individual) in the process (Brown & Smart, 1991). Or, if one’s sense of self already includes a strong altruistic component, one might be compliant with a charity request in order to confirm that view (Piliavin & Coller, 1991).

One self-definitional dimension highly relevant to the compliance process is that of personal consistency. Because most people share to some degree the desire to see themselves as intrapersonally consistent (Cialdini, Trost, & Newcomb, 1995), they are inclined to comply with requests that allow them to enhance or verify a view of themselves as consistent.

Consistency Social psychologists have long understood the strength of the consistency principle in directing human action. Prominent early theorists like Leon Festinger (1957), Fritz Heider (1958), and Theodore Newcomb (1953) viewed the desire for consistency as a prime motivator of our behavior. Subsequently, other theorists (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; Todeschi, 1981) recognized that the desire to appear consistent exerts considerable influence over our behavior as well. If we grant that the power of consistency is formidable in directing human action, an important practical question immediately arises: How is that force engaged? Considerable research suggests that it is engaged through the act of commitment. After making a commitment, one tends to behave in ways that are consistent with it (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Greenwald et al., 1987; Howard, 1990; Sherman, 1980). Any of a variety of strategies may be used to generate the crucial instigating commitment.

One such strategy is the foot-in-the-door technique (Freedman & Fraser, 1966; Schwarz, Bizman, & Raz, 1983). A solicitor using this procedure first asks for a small favor that is almost certain to be granted. The initial compliance is then followed by a request for a larger, related favor. It has been found repeatedly that people who have agreed to the initial, small favor are more willing to do the larger one (see Beaman et al., 1983, for a review), seemingly to be consistent with the implication of the initial ac-
tion. For instance, home owners who had agreed to accept and wear a small lapel pin promoting a local charity were, as a consequence, more likely to contribute money to that charity when canvassed during a subsequent donation drive (Pliner et al., 1974).

Freedman and Fraser (1966) argued that the foot-in-the-door technique is successful because performance of the initially requested action causes a self-perception change; that is, individuals come to see themselves as possessing certain behavior-relevant traits. For example, in the Pliner et al. (1974) study, after taking and wearing the charity pin, subjects would be expected to see themselves as more favorable toward charitable causes, especially the particular charity involved. Later, when asked to perform the larger, related favor of contributing to that charity, subjects would be more willing to do so to be consistent with (i.e., to verify) the “charitable” trait they had assigned to themselves. Support for this interpretation comes from a study showing that children are not influenced by the foot-in-the-door technique until they are old enough to understand the idea of a stable personality trait (around six to seven years). Once children are old enough to understand the meaning of a stable trait, the foot-in-the-door tactic becomes effective, especially among children who prefer consistency in behavior (Eisenberg et al., 1987). Cialdini, Trost, and Newsom (1995) have replicated the latter finding with adults: only those with a strong preference for consistency showed a foot-in-the-door effect. Gorassini and Olson (1995) provided data indicating that changes in self-perception are not sufficient to produce a foot-in-the-door effect. Although compliance with a small request led to greater self-perceptions of helpfulness, these shifts did not mediate willingness to comply with a related, larger request. For the foot-in-the-door effect to appear reliably, then, individuals may have to experience a self-perception change in response to initial compliance and have to be inclined to behave consistently with that changed self-view. The inclination toward consistent responding may come about through dispositional factors, as in the Eisenberg et al. (1987) and Cialdini, Trost, and Newsom (1995) studies, or through situational factors that make consistency salient.

Other, more unsavory techniques induce a commitment to an item and then remove the inducements that generated the commitment. Remarkably, the commitment frequently remains. For example, the bait-and-switch procedure is used by some retailers, who may advertise certain merchandise (e.g., a room of furniture) at a special low price. When the customer arrives to take advantage of the special, he or she finds the merchandise to be of low quality or sold out. However, because customers have by now made an active commitment to getting new furniture at that particular store, they are more willing to agree to examine and, consequently, to buy other merchandise there (Joule, Gouliloux, & Weber, 1989).

Car dealers employ a similar strategy: the lowball technique, in which the dealer obtains a commitment to an action and then increases the costs of performing the action (Cialdini et al., 1978). The automobile salesperson who “throws the lowball” induces the customer to decide to buy a particular model of car by offering a low price on the car or an inflated one on the customer’s trade-in. After the decision has been made—and sometimes after the commitment is enhanced through intermediate commitments, such as allowing the customer to arrange financing, to take the car home overnight, and so on (Joule, 1987)—something happens to remove the reason the customer decided to buy. Perhaps a price calculation error is found, or the used-car assessor disallows the inflated trade-in figure. By this time, though, many customers have experienced an internal commitment to that specific automobile and proceed with the purchase anyway. Experimental research has documented the effectiveness of this tactic in settings beyond automobile sales (Brownstein & Katzov, 1985; Joule, 1987). Additional research indicates that the tactic is effective primarily when used by a single requester (Burger & Petty, 1981) and when the initial commitment is freely made (Cialdini et al., 1978).

One thing that these procedures (and others like them) have in common is the establishment of an earlier commitment that is consistent with a later action desired by the compliance professional. The desire for consistency then takes over to compel performance of the desired behavior. However, not all types of these earlier commitments are equally effective. Some research evidence suggests the types of commitments that lead to consistent future responding. A commitment is likely to be maximally effective in producing consistent future behavior to the extent that it is active (Bem, 1967; Cioffi & Garner, 1996), effortful (Aronson & Mills, 1959), public (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Schlenker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994) and viewed as internally motivated (i.e., uncoerced) (Freedman, 1965; Lydon & Zanna, 1990).

Another approach to employing the consistency principle also is popular among commercial compliance professionals. Rather than inducing a new commitment to their product or service, many practitioners point out existing commitments within potential customers that are consistent with the product or service being offered. In this way, desirable existing commitments are made more visible to the customer and the strain for consistency is allowed to direct behavior accordingly. For example, insurance agents are frequently taught to stress to new home owners that the purchase of an expensive house reflects an enormous personal commitment to one’s home and the well-being of one’s family. Consequently, they argue, it would be only consistent with such a commitment to home and family to purchase home and life insurance in amounts that fit the size of this commitment.
Research of various kinds indicates that this sort of sensitization to commitments and, in addition, to consequent behavioral inconsistencies can be effective in producing changes in belief, attitude, and behavior. Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach, and Grube (1984) demonstrated long-term behavioral effects from a television program that focused viewers on their personal commitments to certain deep-seated values (e.g., freedom, equality) on the one hand, and their current beliefs and behaviors on the other. Not only did uninterrupted viewers of this single program evidence enhanced commitment to these values; they were significantly more likely to donate money to support causes consistent with the values two to three months after the program had aired. A similar effect was noted among Australian consumers of high levels of energy who were shown the discrepancy between their current levels of consumption and their previous pro-conservation statements; they began to conserve significantly more energy than did control subjects (Kantola, Syme, & Campbell, 1984). The tactic of pointing out the discrepancy ("hypocrisy") between an existing commitment and inconsistent current conduct has been employed successfully by Aronson and his colleagues to generate compliance with requests or recommendations for water conservation (Dickerson et al., 1992), recycling action (Fried & Aronson, 1995), and condom use (Stone et al., 1994).

A more manipulative tactic is to put people in a situation in which refusing a specific request would be inconsistent with a value they wish to be known as possessing (Greenwald et al., 1987; Sherman, 1980). One such tactic is the legitimization-of-paltry-favors (or even-a-penny-would-help) technique (Cialdini & Schroeder, 1976). Most people prefer to behave in ways that are consistent with a view of themselves as helpful, charitable individuals. Consequently, a fund-raiser who makes a request that legitimizes a paltry amount of aid ("Could you give a contribution? Even a penny would help.") makes it difficult for a target to refuse to give at all; to do so risks appearing to be a very unhelpful person. Notice that this procedure does not specifically request a trivial sum; that would probably lead to a profusion of pennies and a small total take. Instead, the request simply makes a minuscule form of aid acceptable, thereby reducing the target's ability to give nothing and still remain consistent with the desirable image of a helpful individual. How could a person remain committed to a helpful image after refusing to contribute when "even a penny would help"?

Experimental research to validate the effectiveness of this technique has shown it to be successful in increasing the percentage of charity contributors (Brockner et al., 1984; Cialdini & Schroeder, 1976; Reeves, Macolino, & Martin, 1987; Reingen, 1978; Weyant, 1984). Moreover, in each of these studies the even-a-penny procedure proved profitable, because subjects gave not a penny, but rather the donation amount typically given to charities. Thus, the legitimization-of-paltry-favors approach appears to work by getting more people to agree to give (so as to be consistent with a helpful image); but the decision of how much to give is left unaffected by the mention of a paltry amount. The consequence is increased proceeds.

One final commitment-based tactic deserves mention—one in which the target person goes on record as feeling or doing well before being asked to contribute resources to a worthy-sounding cause. The theory behind this tactic is that people who have just asserted that they are doing or feeling fine—even as a routine part of a sociable exchange—will consequently find it awkward to appear stingy in the context of their own admittedly favorable circumstances. An experiment by Daniel Howard (1990) put the theory to test. Dallas, Texas, residents were called on the phone and asked if they would agree to allow a representative of the Hunger Relief Committee to come to their homes to sell them cookies, the proceeds from which would be used to supply meals for the needy. When tried alone, that request (labeled the standard solicitation approach) produced only 18 percent agreement. However, if the caller initially asked, "How are you feeling this evening?" and waited for a reply before proceeding with the standard approach, several noteworthy things happened. First, of the 120 individuals called, most (108) gave the customary favorable reply ("Good," "Fine," "Real well," etc.). Second, 32 percent of the people who got the how-are-you-feeling-today question agreed to receive the cookie seller at their homes, nearly twice the success rate of the standard solicitation approach. Third, true to the consistency principle, almost everyone who agreed to such a visit did make a cookie purchase when contacted at home (89 percent).

Summary: Compliance

At the outset of this section, we suggested that an important question for anyone interested in understanding, resisting, or harnessing the compliance process is, Which are the most powerful principles that motivate individuals to comply with another person's request? We also suggested that one way to assess such power is to examine the practices of commercial compliance professionals for their persuasiveness. The widespread use by compliance practitioners of certain principles would be evidence for the natural power of these principles to affect everyday compliance. Six psychological principles emerged as the most popular in the repertoires of compliance professionals: reciprocity, consistency, social validation, friendship or liking, authority, and scarcity. Close examination of the principles revealed broad professional usage that could be validated and explained by controlled experimental research. As with most
research perspectives, additional work needs to be done. However, at this juncture considerable evidence indicates that these six principles engage central features of the human condition to motivate compliance.

**CONCLUSION**

The social influence process is an undeniably central component of social interaction. People seek to influence and allow themselves to be influenced in almost every interpersonal segment of their lives. It is not surprising, then, that the influence process serves multiple goals. Our review of the relevant literatures in the areas of social norms, conformity, and compliance led us to see three such goals: to behave effectively, to build and maintain relationships, and to manage self-concept. It is our view that each of these goals offers an important rationale for influence and offers, accordingly, a way to understand many of the effects typically found in the literatures reviewed.

At the same time, it should be recognized that we assigned these effects to a particular goal often for reasons of organizational efficiency, and such assignment should not be taken to imply that only a single goal is being served. Indeed, the most powerful effects in our literatures are likely to be powerful precisely because they contribute to the attainment of more than one goal. For example, the tendency to comply with a request that is consistent with an earlier commitment is likely due to a desire to be consistent (serving the goal of managing self-concept), a desire to look consistent to others (serving the goal of building and maintaining relationships), and a desire to act correctly (serving the goal of behaving effectively). The simultaneous satisfaction of multiple goals should only enhance the likelihood that an influence attempt will succeed.

Although the goal motivation framework of this chapter may appear to focus on the social motives of the individual, it is important to remember that most responses to social influence attempts are also affected by the situational context of the influence effort. Moreover, goals can interact with social situations in a variety of ways (Endler, 1993). First, different situations can make different goals salient for the same individual. For instance, seeing someone pick up a piece of litter in an otherwise clean environment can activate the motive for social approval (serving the goal of building and maintaining relationships), decreasing the likelihood of littering (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). But even if an individual's personal norm is opposed to littering, seeing someone toss a candy wrapper into a heavily littered environment may trigger littering behavior, as it describes what others do in that situation to rid themselves of trash (serving the goal of behaving effectively). Situations can also change people's motives. For instance, in a work setting, uncertain newcomers may conform to the group perception at the outset because they think that the group offers the most accurate view (serving the goal of behaving effectively), but after greater experience in the situation, their conformity may be based more on a desire to avoid negative sanctions from the group (serving the goal of building and maintaining social relationships). Finally, situational constraints on behavior, including such factors as environmental contingencies and source characteristics, interact with individual characteristics to affect the goals that are activated. Asking a person to contribute time to a cancer organization because it will "make you feel good about yourself" may be effective for someone who is low in self-esteem, since such behavior can bolster self-perception (serving the goal of managing self-concept), but it may backfire with a person who has high self-esteem and is more motivated by relational goals, such as interacting with a committed group (serving the goal of building and maintaining relationships). Any fully informed explanation of social influence must consider the characteristics of both the influence target and the setting, and the numerous ways in which they may interact.

In all, it is clear that the social influence process is both rich and complex. This fact accounts for the large body of existing work exploring the functioning of the social influence process and ensures that it will in the future, as in the past, be the focus of much research.

**NOTES**

1. Although Schaller and Latane's (1996) discussion of "culturally shared beliefs" focuses on the evolution of stereotypes, the analysis is applicable to the evolution of norms as well (M. Schaller, personal communication, November 21, 1995).
2. Note the emphasis on social norms. Those who study small-group behavior have extensively examined the emergence of task-related norms; for a review, see Levine and Moreland, 1997, in this Handbook.
3. The effects of normative and informational influence will be considered more thoroughly in the next section, "Conformity."
4. For reviews of the factors affecting conformity and nonconformity, see Allen (1965, 1975).
5. Although the minority was originally conceptualized as a group that lacks power, status, or strength in numbers (Moscovici, 1976), most of the research has operationalized the minority as numerically inferior to the majority.
6. However, when the purpose of social comparison is to make oneself feel better or to motivate oneself to greater accomplishments, people sometimes compare themselves to others who are not similar but who are below or above
them on a relevant dimension (Collins, 1995; Suls & Willis, 1990; Wood, 1989).

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CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

ATTRACTION AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS

ELLEN BERSCHEID, University of Minnesota
HARRY T. REIS, University of Rochester

THE STUDY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

A chapter devoted to theory and research on interpersonal attraction did not appear in this Handbook until its third edition (Berscheid, 1985b). That chapter outlined the historical development of the area and reviewed the robust body of theory and research that had accumulated since the early 1960s, when interest in attraction phenomena increased dramatically. At the time the chapter was being written, the study of interpersonal attraction was in transition:

Investigators are turning from a focus upon attraction phenomena as they occur in initial encounters between strangers to a study of attraction in the context of ongoing relationships; from a view of attraction as a monolithic global construct to a recognition that it is fruitful to differentiate varieties of attraction; from an exclusive study of the mild forms of attraction (e.g., liking) to studies that include the more intense forms (e.g., love); from investigations of a single stimulus at a single point in time and its influence on attraction to an interest in how a variety of causal conditions may contribute to an attraction phenomenon and how they all may evolve and change over time; from an exclusive focus upon how the characteristics of the individual (or of the other, or of their combination) influence attraction to a consideration of how these characteristics may interact with environmental variables, both physical and social, to affect attraction and how attraction itself may subsequently influence all of these variables. (Berscheid, 1985b, pp. 417-418)

Today, all of these transitions have been made. Most important is the shift in focus from attraction as it may or may not occur between strangers in initial encounters to attraction phenomena as they are embedded in ongoing interpersonal relationships. In addition to attraction between naturalistically formed relationship partners, many other facets of relationships have captured the attention of social psychologists in the past decade. The shift from an almost exclusive focus on attraction to a wide variety of other relationship phenomena is reflected in the titles of Annual Review of Psychology surveys beginning in the late 1970s: “Interpersonal Attraction and Relationships” (Huston & Levinger, 1978); “Interpersonal Processes in Close Relationships” (Clark & Reis, 1988); and, most recently, “Interpersonal Relationships” (Berscheid, 1994). The inclusion of the phrase “close relationships” in the title of this chapter reflects this change in focus. It also reflects the fact that social psychology has become an important contributor to the development of a science of relationships.

The Science of Interpersonal Relationships

Many of the questions traditionally addressed by the social and behavioral sciences, as well as by the biological and